On the Role of Reason

(A critique on Hume’s account on reason)

Hume’s account on reason is controversial; it is opposed to the old Western view that the mind is higher than the body – that reason is higher than sensation. Hume has actually been very consistent in his philosophy; it is not only in his epistemology that he claims that reason is just a species of sensation, he also claims in his ethical and aesthetic philosophies that the reason is a slave of passion. What does he mean by this?

David Hume does not only claim that there are no innate principles in the mind, he also claims that our ideas, wherein which our reason deals with, are just copies of our impressions. These impressions are the products of our sensation, i.e. these are our perceptions when we see, hear, feel, taste, etc. those that are in the material world. These impressions give rise to our sentiments or passions regarding a particular object or thing. Reasoning, for Hume, comes after we receive these impressions and deals with them soon after we have them. Reasoning comes only after we experience the material world; hence, we cannot possibly reason if we did not have any experiences yet (for there are no ideas wherein our reason will deal with). This is what is meant by saying that ‘reason cannot extend beyond our immediate experiences’.

Reason deals with either matters of fact or relations of ideas; it ‘conveys the knowledge of truth and of falsehood’[1]. Impression, on the other hand, gives rise to sentiments or passions that are not subject to the discovery of truth or falsehood; they are thoughts (motivations) in the mind, separate from the outside world. It is the passion or sentiment that produces approbation or blame; it is the passion or sentiment that drives us to act. Reason cannot be the motivation of our actions because it only deals with the agreement of our ideas (within the mind and/or as related to the world), which made it ‘a slave of passions’

This view is revolutionary; it deviates from the traditional view. However, something seems wrong with this. Let us try to examine it captiously.

The role of reason and of sentiment in Hume’s philosophy could be seen in this step-by-step process: (1) Reason understands the facts after we have the impressions acquired from the material world, e.g. after working on the relations of the ideas of a gun and of killing, my reason would tell me that I can use the gun to kill a person. (2) The sentiment would be stimulated by the facts that are set by reason; it would produce either approbation or blame, e.g. I disapprove of using the gun to kill a person due to a certain feeling against it. (3) I will act based on the sentiment, e.g. I will not use the gun to kill a person.

I, on the other hand, believe that the case is like this: (1) and (2) same as above, (3) Reason functions through willing, e.g. Based on my disapproval of using the gun to kill a person, what would I do? (4) I will act based on my ‘will’ or reason.

The difference between the two is that the former does not take into consideration the act of “willing” as independent from sentiment. Hume would say that if I did not act according to what I approve, it must be because I am driven by another passion or sentiment.

I am wholly against this view of Hume. The feeling of approbation on a thing is different from the act of deciding on whether to follow such feeling. It is only us who put a necessary connection between the two because we tend to find the necessary causes of our actions. This view (of mine) is not incompatible with saying that the mental processes are just neurophysiological processes in the brain (just like what I tend to argue in my critique on Descartes[2]); for if sentiment / feeling about a thing and reasoning are both mental processes, and are thus, neurophysiological, it does not mean that they comprise one process (or that they are identical with one another). Reasoning is a brain process that occurs and performs a function different and independent from other brain processes including the feeling about a thing (sentiment).

Accepting Hume’s theory is accepting a seemingly infinite regress of motives or passions in such a way that all our actions are defined. It rejects the possibility of choosing and willing as independent from any motives. It accounts that even if I am able to choose on whether to act according to a motive, I am still choosing based on another motive. Hume’s philosophy limits us in such a way that all our actions are defined by only one sort of mental process – by the process that deals with sentiments or passions. It fails to account that the other sort of brain or mental process (thinking or reasoning) acts on a way of its own. Even if the two sorts of mental process may influence each other, they still function differently and independently from each other.

Lastly, though I do not wish to be a representative of the traditional Western view, I would firmly argue that Reason is not a slave of passion, not even a species of sensation. As Kant (in his Critique of Pure Reason) said, we started to have knowledge when we started to have experience, but not all knowledge arises out of experience. This is for the reason that there are transcendental presuppositions in the mind. One of them is the most basic logical principle where all other logical principles are derived and which I learned not from experience – the Principle of Identity (that ‘A is A’)[3].

[1] Classical and Ethical Theories. David Hume, The Principles of Morals, p. 259
[2] from my essay, A Critique on Descartes’ Dualism
[3] a more elaboration regarding the transcendental presuppositions can be found in my essay, Can Logical Principles be falsified by Experience?