Someone has asked: Why would it be absurd for a philosophical system to reject wholesale the reality of objects of experience?
Disclaimer: The purpose of this paper is not to affirm or deny the existence of a material world, rather, to enquire on philosophical systems’ method of enquiry regarding material world.
It is not really absurd to reject wholesale the reality of objects of experience, i.e. the material world, if absurdity is to be defined as being contrary to reason, as how it is ordinarily defined. If we would say that a philosophical system that denies the existence of the material world is being unreasonable or illogical, it is like saying that philosophical systems such as Idealism and Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism[1] are illogical.
For the purpose of this enquiry, it is of good if we would first clarify two concepts that are used in the question posited – ‘absurdity’ and ‘objects of experience’. The term absurdity, other than the aforementioned, signifies that it is (nearly) impossible for a philosophical system to validly deny the reality of objects of experience. The ‘objects of experience’, on the other hand, are the objects wherein which our ideas are based. These objects are grasped (according to some philosophers) due to experience. Hence, they exist outside of us, as they themselves are not the objects of our thought, rather the objects of the objects of our thought (or the objects of our ideas), and these objects that exist outside of us are (believed to be) composed of matter.[2]
Connecting the term absurdity to the act of denying the reality of material world is rooted from the difficulty in denying the existence of such. The question now is why.
In answering the question, one may argue in terms of ‘self-evidence’; that there is no need to question it (the existence of material reality) because it (simply) is. The human mind has a tendency to presuppose a necessary connection[3] between the objects of thought and the objects of experience.
We certainly cannot deny the existence of the objects of our thoughts (or our ideas) because the mere fact that we can engage in discourses and can think, imagine, will, etc. proves that there are ideas in our minds. We cannot deny them because they are already in us. However, in the event of our certainty regarding the existence of ideas, we presuppose the existence of an external world, which is material, wherein which we necessarily (seem to) base the existence of ideas. We presuppose a necessary connection between the objects of thought and objects of experience as if the objects of experience indeed exist. The question that may be posted is whether the existence of an idea (or an object of thought) must of necessity be attributed as something that is derived from an external world, which is material.
At this point, we may extend the enquiry as to asking whether the external world is material as how most philosophers would claim. Locke and Hume certainly would concur to the idea that the external world is a material world. Even Descartes, a rationalist, believes in such, and he argues so because he believes that we can receive impressions from the material world (only that we can be deceived by our senses). However, if we are to be skeptical as how Descartes and Hume were, we could also be skeptical regarding the existence of a material world. It could be the case that we think that a material world exists because our minds have a propensity to do so – because we can put a necessary connection between the matter and our idea.
When we think of Empiricists such as Locke and Hume, we think of their philosophy as something that considers the proposition “The material world exists” as an axiom. That seems to be what Empiricism professes. However, we could also look at one sort of empiricism that denies the existence of matter – the philosophy of Berkeley.
Berkeley believes that the existence of things, which is sensible, is grasped through perception. However, the existence of these things is not composed of matter but of clusters of sense data or of ideas. Thus, he is saying that what we can only perceive are ideas. This is what we can only claim, for we cannot be certain whether matter exists since it is only the idea that which is in us. Take as an example my perception of a ball. I perceive it because I have an idea of it, but I cannot say that this idea is based on the material object because I do not have the means to prove so. All I have in me and all I can examine is my mere idea of the ball. If we will extend it to us, (Berkeley would say that) we are not composed of matter but of ideas. We are ideas in the mind of God. I cannot even say (according to Berkeley) that my perception of my body implies that my body is composed of matter. All I have is my idea of my body. In this case, Berkeley wholly rejects that the external world is a material world; he argues that the only existents are souls/spirits and ideas.
Surely, we can provide a critique on Berkeley’s philosophy – that it assumes that there is a God; that inability to conceive matter does not imply its non-existence, etc. However, to call a philosophical system such as his as absurd is to be absorbed in the school of thought claiming that material world exists. Furthermore, we cannot disregard his view as it challenges the traditional view regarding matter and the material world. Berkeley’s philosophy is not absurd as it is not illogical, though it may seem so for those who are so absorbed (to the point that they are almost imprisoned) in the previously stated school of thought. In this issue, there is a clash of philosophical frameworks and to term one as absurd is to do an injustice to such philosophy, especially if another framework that contradicts it would be used to criticize it (without understanding it first).
[1] Idealism holds that the reality is consisted of ideas. Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism holds the same thing but focuses more on how an individual perceived an idea. Berkeley is skeptic of the existence of matter as they are inconceivable. What we can only grasp are the objects of our mind.
[2] The term ‘object’ has two senses: it could be used to signify an idea (object of thought) or an object in the material world (object of experience).
[3] a concept borrowed from Hume but used differently
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