For-itself-for-others

(a summary of Sartre's being-for-Others)

Before going on to the discussion of the relation of the I to the Other, it is necessary to explain the I and its Being. It must be noted that the I (I) as a being is different from Being. The I as a being is an entity; the Being is the Being of this being (or could be better understood as the essence of this being) and is not an entity. So the I (or I) has (have) a Being, which has a structure. We must enquire now on the structure of the I’s Being.

There are structures of Being, which are not beings themselves. The being-in-itself is a Being that is immanent; it has a defined end and is already complete. It has no possibilities and thus, has no freedom. The being-for-itself, on the other hand, is incomplete. It has no defined end, is fluid and is always in the state of coming-to-be. This being-for-itself is the structure of the I’s Being. The I is free and it can choose among any of its possibilities. The for-itself’s relation to the in-itself could be revealed in the presence of the Other.

If through the Other’s look, I am objectified and reduced to my factual existence, I am reduced to an in-itself. With this, as a for-itself, my Being tries to reclaim its freedom through escaping its factual existence, i.e. its being in-itself (where the in-itself is not the foundation of its being). In this flight, its also pursues the impossible future wherein it would be an in-itself-for-itself, i.e. the in-itself would be the foundation of its own. The for-itself is thus a flight and a pursuit. It flees its being in-itself and at the same time pursues it. It is a pursued-pursuing.[1] Here, the I is said to be “not what it is and is what it is not”. It is not what it is because it (the for-itself) is not the in-itself (its facticity); it is not what it is not because it is its possibilities that it pursues (that it is not). The I is its own nothingness. It is not its facticity (its past and present) and not even the future that it pursues.

So if there are Others, it must be noted that they are also free and also in the state of becoming. An Other is also his own nothingness. The structure of the Being of the Other is the same with the structure of the Being of the I because the Other is also a self like the I. I cannot escape from dealing with Others because I am not the foundation of my own facticity – of my own existence. Being-for-Others is a consequence of being thrown into this world.

The Other appears to me through the “Look”. “In every look, there is the appearance of the Other-as-object a concrete and probable presence in my perceptive field.”[2] The look makes me realize that I am not alone in this world – that I exist for all men. So it is not the existence of the Other that is dubitable because the Other is everywhere. What is questionable is its being there – or whether I really am seen from where I am; but the existence of the Other should not be questioned because he exists. Even in the Other’s absence, we will recognize that the Other exists, because in the first place, we will not say that a person is absent if he does not exist. Absence must not be understood as not being there. Absence is “a bond between two or several human realities”, which requires the presence of these realities to each other. Hence, it is in Other’s relation to me that I can say that he is absent (and this necessitates his existence). If this is so (that he is everywhere), then I am always looked-at.

When it comes to the object of the look, there is the “being-looked-at” and the “being-looking-at”. Let us try to examine the I as being-looked-at.

If I am being-looked-at, I am the one objectified, and as previously stated, the one reduced to an in-itself when the Other has already defined me the way he wanted. As a looked-at, I appear only as a presence to the Other as he makes me as his object. In his act of looking at me, though there is a distance between us, he experiences my distanceless presence to him. This is because his attention is focused on me as a presence in his perceptive field; because he makes me as his object. If I happen to recognize that I am being-looked-at, I would recognize the Other’s infinite freedom that limits my own freedom. I know that as a for-itself, I have possibilities; but because the Other projects his own possibilities in me and because he has already made a definition of me that is outside of me, my possibilities become limited. My possibilities are reduced into probabilities. I am no longer free to choose among the possibilities that I used to have because the Other limits this freedom. With the Other’s look, he is the master of the situation and I am his slave.

As a looked-at, I could have subjective reactions to the Other’s look. I could feel shame or the feeling that I have “fallen into the world” in that which I need the Other’s mediation in order for me to be me. I could also feel fear or the discovery of myself as being threatened because of being a presence in this world. This fear is a flight and is not an authentic attitude toward the look. Sartre asserted that there are two authentic subjective attitudes toward the look. First is the shame that made me recognize the Other as a subject for whom I am an object. Second is the arrogance that made me affirm my freedom by confronting the Other. Here, I apprehend myself as a free object and that I could make the Other as my object.

Now, let us say, I want to reclaim my freedom. As a being-looked-at, I would try to negate that situation wherein I will become the subject, and the Other as object. This is the internal negation and the sort of negation that a for-itself must have. This internal negation negates the external negation wherein I am the one who is the object of the Other. Here, the Me-as-object will strive to become Me-as-subject so that the Other-as-subject will become the Other-as-object. This objectivation of the Other is a defense on my part as a for-itself to reclaim my freedom. The Me-as-subject becomes the limit of the freedom of the Other-as-object. I now become the master of the situation.

Being an object-being-for-others or subject-being-for-others is dependent on who conceives it. The nature of the look depends on how I apprehend the situation – on whether I am the one looked-at or looking-at. The look makes me recognize that I also am (other than a for-itself) a being-for-Others. The Other and the I are co-responsible for each other’s existence. Though we are not the foundation of our existences, we are responsible for our Beings. I claim the Me-as-object or Me-as-subject as mine, The Other claims the Other-as-object or Other-as-subject as his. We exist for each other and each of us carries the world as consequence of being abandoned as free beings in this world. These things are made clear to us through the look. The look made clear to us that we are not alone – that others are everywhere.

Hence, the fundamental relation of the I to the Other, is being-for-Others. This being-for-Others is “not an ontological structure of a for-itself” because it (for-Others) is not derived from it (for-itself). But as aforementioned, the cogito will reveal to us that our being as a man is not only a for-itself but also for-Others. The for-itself would not be a man if it were not a for-Others. It must be recognized that there are Others and as thrown into the world, we are condemned to be here with Others. My being that is revealed to me, then, is a for-itself-for-others.

[1] Chapter 3: Concrete relations with Others, Part 3: Being-for-Others, Being and Nothingness
[2] Part 4: The Look, Being and Nothingness