A Defense of the Critique / A Critique of the Method

Through the course of this essay, let us focus on Kant’s language and framework and confuse not his views with other systems. It may be the case that disagreements among philosophers lie in their differences in use of language, but they might[1] be just saying the same thing. For the purpose of this essay, let me examine Kant’s view on appearance and reality by dividing it to several points: [P1][2] (Kant argued that) An object has both appearance and reality. [P2] An object’s appearance, which Kant calls as phenomena, is how we perceive such object (how our senses represent the object as it appears to us). [P3] An object’s reality, or the noumena, is that which the object does not give to us (thing-in-itself) that we cannot know. [P4] Following this line of argument, we cannot have a science of Metaphysics or go beyond what is knowable (or phenomenal sphere). These propositions assume the truthfulness of these two: [A1][3] there are limits of our understanding, and [A2] there exists in an object that our understanding cannot grasp. Let me examine all these one by one. Most philosophers would agree that [P1]; only that they would have different definitions of appearance and reality. Husserl, for example, used the terms differently, which actually led him to a conclusion that appearance is not different from reality. Husserl’s concept of appearance is not merely how our senses represent an object in us, but how an object shows itself to us. Hence, if an object shows itself, it shows itself (and thus, there can be no reality beyond our knowledge). However, we cannot just use this view of Husserl in refuting Kant’s because they are using different language. Indeed, their views are not incompatible with each other if both used the same language. Kant argued that nature is a totality of appearances (of how our senses represent nature as it appears to us); Husserl argued that nature is of appearances and reality (of how nature appears to us or how it makes itself appear to us). Husserl does not actually talk of reality as how Kant defines it; he actually does not make an account of that which the object does not show. We will realize that we will do injustice to both theories if we will use one to refute the other, without recognizing their differences in use of terms. Hence, for the analyses of succeeding points, we have to stick to Kant’s use of terms, as the real purpose of this essay is to provide a critique of Kant’s theory. There is no problem that I can observe with [P2]. If we perceive an object, that must be because there is an object that is capable of being perceived. The object must appear to us or must be present before us, which actually made it able of being represented by our senses in us. The dispute actually rises with [P3]. Let me examine it alongside with [A1] and [A2]. I assent to the idea that there are limits of our understanding. Even if it were argued that, it is possible for the human understanding to understand or to comprehend everything, it would not discount that there are indeed limits of human understanding. For to say that it is possible, is not incompatible with saying that we cannot understand and comprehend everything. If understanding is one way of gaining knowledge, and if it is indeed limited, then we are also limited in gaining knowledge. Before we can say that there is in an object that the understanding cannot grasp, we must first account that objects exist in their own right, and this amounts to a rejection of Idealism. Let me, in this essay; argue under the assumption that Idealism is flawed. I believe that I no longer have to prove the flaws of Idealism in this essay as I have done it in my previous work. I would further argue that one cannot argue, “The unperceived cannot exist” because existence is not an accidental feature, rather an essential feature of an object. An object does not exist by virtue of being perceived; an object is perceived by virtue of its having existence. In rejecting Idealism, I do not only wish to reject Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism but also Hegelian Idealism. Hegel’s claim, “The Real is Rational, The Rational is Real” would be true if “everything is knowable”, wherein the use of “is” is not of predication, but of identity and where all members of “everything” are members of “knowable” and vice-versa. It would be absurd to say that “is” in “everything is knowable” is only of predication, because the group “knowable” cannot be a group larger than “everything”. If “knowable” is larger than “everything”, we can say that “nothing”, which is not part of “everything”, is knowable. However, this is a logical impossibility because we cannot grant existence to “nothing”; “nothing” is simply the non-existence of anything. The claim, “The Real is Rational, The Rational is Real” may only be true under two conditions: (1) if reality is constructed by mind, and (2) if “everything is knowable”. Since I have already rejected the former (as I have rejected Subjective Idealism in my previous work), we are now left with (2). Hegel’s claim would be saved if it is true, and this would totally reject Kant’s concept of noumena and limits of knowledge. However, we may again ask whether “everything is knowable”. As previously argued, I do not think so. I am more inclined to think that there are limits of the understanding. Furthermore, if it is true, it may be because either the reality is constructed or the reality is outside of us (which is knowable). If reality is constructed, it follows that we can comprehend the whole of reality because it is just a creation of mind; but as I have rejected it beforehand, we are left with the latter – that the reality, which is outside of us, is knowable. This is extremely absurd; how can we know the whole outside reality if in comprehending the world, we use sensation, which we cannot doubt as capable of being flawed? I would say that the analysis of human structure itself would lead us to knowing that we cannot comprehend everything. Hence, there is something in reality, which we cannot grasp. Now that I have defended assumptions [A1] and [A2], it seems that proposition [P3] is also true; for if we combine the two assumptions ([A1] that there are limits of the understanding and [A2] that there is in an object that we cannot grasp) it logically follows that we have to accept that there is “noumena” (the thing-in-itself). If one is not yet persuaded with my arguments, consider this one: In analyzing the question whether there exists noumena, one can only say that he either knows the answer or that he does not know the answer. Certainly, there must only be one answer to the question, which is either “yes” (there exists noumena) or “no” (there is no noumena). If one happens to say that he does not know the answer, this already proves that an unknowable exists (i.e. the answer to the question exists). If one happens to say that he knows the answer, it does not follow that he really knows the true answer. He might just be assuming that he knows. If we say that, we cannot be sure or that we cannot actually know the answer to “Does noumena exist?” because if there is, it is unknowable, we are actually saying that the unknowable (i.e. the answer to the question) actually exists, as there cannot be no answer to the question. Lastly, [P4] or that “there can be no science of Metaphysics (beyond phenomena)” is a good account because we actually cannot claim the certainty of our knowledge of the unknowable. We cannot even have knowledge of the unknowable. What we can only have are mere interpretations of those that are beyond the limits of human understanding. This is where I actually find Kant’s absurdity in his writings; he himself studied what is beyond the limits of human reason and talked of metaphysical concepts. Furthermore, though I hold that there is a phenomena-noumena distinction, Kant’s philosophy offers a problem on how we are to know whether we are going beyond the phenomenal realm and are already interpreting the noumenal realm[4]. Kant may be saying that he is merely giving accounts of the capacities of our understanding in his Critique of Pure Reason and that this is just a matter of giving an account of the phenomena. However, his Critique talks of abstract concepts, which actually seem to be just products of his interpretation of the noumenal realm. [1] The term “might” signifies that I am not stating that philosophers are indeed (only) saying the same thing. [2] P = proposition [3] A = assumption [4] that we cannot know whether we are already interpreting the noumenal realm or just making an account of the phenomenal realm proves that noumena (i.e. the answer to this issue) exists.