Demanding an Ontological Answer

a reply to: When we ask what knowledge really is, we demand an ontological answer. Is this possible? Why or why not? Why are ontological questions difficult to answer?

More often than not, philosophers demand an ontological answer to the question on what knowledge is. This is because in wanting to understand the nature of knowledge (or Knowledge, if ever there is an absolute one), most philosophers would consider as an imperative the activity of looking for the is-ness of knowledge (or Knowledge, whichever one wants) than looking for examples that could be considered as knowledge. In the former, what is being sought is the being (if there is such) or the real meaning of knowledge; that in the question “What is knowledge?”, the demand is to look for the identity and not for the mere description of knowledge that, on the other hand, could be the result of merely giving examples. As such, if “Knowledge is X” is the ontological answer to the question, then the “X”, more than a descriptive account, is the identity of knowledge. The relational tool “is” is used to explicate identity – that if we translate the statement, it would be this: Knowledge = X.

Searching for an ontological answer would require going beyond the obvious so that there will be an enquiry regarding what is within the knowledge itself. It is commonly thought that to reach the ontological is to examine only the transcendental or that which is beyond the obvious. But it would also require examining the obvious as the case could be like what Pirsig, in his Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, is saying: “The Truth knocks on the door, and you say ‘Go away, I’m looking for the Truth’, and so it goes away”. The is-ness is composed of both the obvious and the not. From here, we could see the need for demanding an ontological answer so as to have an investigation that would examine both the obvious and the not. We may be blinded by both the familiar and the transcendental (or the obvious and the not).

The answer to the question “Is this possible?” is “Yes” if what is meant by the term “this” is our demand to arrive at an ontological answer. We can always demand to fly, to turn ourselves into frogs or to arrive at an ontological answer whether or not we can fly, turn ourselves into frogs and arrive at an ontological answer. The act of demanding is different to getting an ontological answer.

Likewise, if the term “this” means the “ontological answer”, the answer is “Yes” for the question is about possibility. To say that a thing is possible is not incompatible to saying that it is not possible. Even if we change the question to “Is there an ontological answer (in terms of knowledge)?”, the answer will always have to be “Yes” because if we say that there is none, we also say that knowledge does not exist – that if “X” in “Knowledge is X” does not exist, then Knowledge does not exist. To say so is not only problematic but also logically impossible since our act of enquiring itself into the nature and meaning of knowledge implies that there is indeed knowledge, whether absolute or not. If what others mean when they say, “Knowledge does not exist” is that “What we call knowledge is merely a belief”, it still does not follow that knowledge does not exist because in this claim, the term “knowledge” has a meaning, and that meaning is “belief”. If it does have meaning, it must, first and foremost, exist.

Lastly, if “Is this possible?” means “Is arriving at an ontological answer possible?”, the answer will be “Yes” because, again, the question deals with possibility. But if the question is “Can we arrive at an ontological answer?”, my answer would be neither a “yes” nor a “no”, but an “I don’t know”. To arrive at such is like to reach the top of a mountain ten times higher than Mt. Everest. Likewise, to claim that we arrive at an ontological answer is being a pseudo-intellectual as it is the case that we are limited in terms of sense perception and of understanding things. However elitist we are when it comes to our views, we are only taking leaps of faith.

At any rate, demanding for an ontological answer that would lead to searching for it is a healthy task. Our enquiry on both the obvious and the not would be the best method to at least overcome the blindness brought about by the familiar and the transcendental.