1. On the Purpose and Method1.1 The central aim of this enquiry is to investigate meaning in complex situations – where there are what we call partial- and double- meaning statements; to examine sentences that implicates more than what is literally uttered.
1.2 To attain the aim, it is essential to enquire on the nature of meaning and start the analysis on it in simple situations – where sentences implicates only what was uttered.
1.3 This enquiry will not deal only with statements (spoken and written), but also with speech acts. As stated in my previous essay (in the take home exam), speech acts may be either voluntary (the performer of the act is aware that he’s doing something to convey a meaning) or involuntary (the performer is unaware of his act, yet his intention is still manifested in the act).
1.4 In referring to the speaker of the statement or the performer of the act, I will use the term originator (to designate that the statement/act came from him), to the hearer or receiver, receiver (to designate that he is the receiver of the statement/act that has a meaning), to the statement or act, utterance. In examining the meaning, the utterance is the one being judged, not the originator’s capability to utter it or the receiver’s capability to understand it.
2. On the Distinction between the Problems of Truth and Meaning and On Meaningfulness
2.1.1 The Problem of Meaning is distinct from the Problem of Truth: The latter deals with the external world, the former only with the language (the attempt of man to express and communicate the objects of his thought, including his perception of the external world, to others). The Question on Truth (especially of a statement) entails the Question on Meaning for it is necessary to examine the utterance and know how it is used in the language in order for it to be compared to the external world (and to ask the Question on Truth).
2.1.2 The Question on Meaning, however, does not entail the Question on Truth.
2.2.1 Most people think that the Question on Meaning entail the Question on Truth; that to ask the meaning of the utterance, Snow is white is to compare it to the external world and see whether there exists a snow that is white. Such thought is brought about by failure to recognize the complexity of language and by analyzing language by only using simple utterances that are empirically verifiable (such as Snow is white). If we would only recognize the distinction, we would not verify the existence of a white snow if we are only about to ask the meaning of Snow is white. The meaning of such is different from its truth – value.
2.2.2 Clearly, to ask the meaning of something does not entail asking that something’s truthfulness or existence in the external world. (The nature of Truth had been discussed on my previous essay). The utterance Snow is white could never mean this: There is a snow that exists that is white or If X is a snow, then X exists and X is white. Rather, it means this: If there is a snow, then such is white or If X is a snow, then X is white. It is just a matter of an if – then situation wherein the antecedent (the if) does not need to exist to imply the consequent (the then) and wherein such if – then situation can be uttered by the originator and can be grasped by the receiver/s (or by those in the linguistic community).
2.2.3 In the same manner, the utterance Dogs have wings is meaningful (capable of having a meaning), whether or not dogs exist or they indeed have wings (if they exist). Meaningfulness of an utterance depends on the linguistic community. An utterance is meaningful if it is said to be communicable.
2.2.4 Communicability (capability of being communicable) of an utterance is of two components: the utterance’s utterability and the utterance’s understandability. An utterance has utterability if it is capable of being uttered or being delivered by the originator, and has understandability if t is capable of being understood or comprehended by the receiver. An utterance is understandable if the receiver (who is from the same linguistic community as the originator) is able to grasp the if – then situation connected to the utterance (or if the receiver is able to picture the logical possibility of such).
2.2.5 Considering such, not all mere utterances are meaningful. The utterance Ba is We[1] is meaningless as it is not understandable by the receiver (and hence, not communicable). I, as the originator, could not even utter such with a thought that others in the linguistic community would understand such. I cannot even picture an if – then situation of Ba is We as there are no words as Ba and We in the linguistic community where I will utter it, which shows us that Ba and We have no functions in the linguistic community.
2.2.6 And Wittgenstein was right in stating that Private language is impossible. No one can ever invent the words Ba and We and say that Ba is We has a meaning in isolation from his linguistic community.
2.3.1 That the meaningfulness and thus, meaning, is dependent on the linguistic community would be better understood with the Idioms as example.
2.3.2 There is certainly no need to compare Idioms with the external world (or know their Truthfulness). Idioms have meanings that are derived from the individual words and as such, referential theory (particularly, ostensive definition) will certainly not be applicable for in pointing to the referent of individual words, different meaning could be gained.
2.3.3 The French idiom Il n’y a pas de quoi would have a different meaning if referential theory would be used. If such theory will be used, we have to focus on its literal meaning (It has not there if what) and not on how that idiom functions in the French linguistic community.
2.3.4 Such idiom’s meaning (You’re Welcome) is known to the French linguistic community to where it is used. Clearly, the meaning of an idiom depends not on how it is connected to its literal referent (or on how it relates to the external world) but on how such idiom functions in a particular linguistic community.
2.3.5 Arguably, I, who am not part of the French linguistic community, may find the given idiom meaningless for in the first place, I cannot utter it as I do not understand it and do not even know its function in the linguistic community. Likewise, if I am to deliver it to a receiver from a linguistic community different from the French linguistic community, no one will understand it. Even if the receivers and I are from the same linguistic community, if none of us understand French, then the given idiom will just remain as an utterance for us.
3. On Meaning
3.1.1It is to be noted that I, through this course of enquiry, am making revision regarding my previous account on meaning (on my previous essay).
3.1.2 Different from my previous account, meaning is not solely what the originator wants to convey that the receiver must grasp. It is not solely the intention of the originator or what he wants to express in uttering the utterance. Meaning is the function of the utterance in a linguistic community.
3.2.1 Intention refers to the thought of the originator that is the basis of the utterance (whether a statement or a speech act). It is what drives the performance of the utterance. E.g. (statement) My intention or thought that All swans are white made me utter the statement All swans are white; (speech act) my intention to bid goodbye made me wave my hand so as the receiver would understand that I’m bidding goodbye.
3.2.2. Meaning cannot be the intention for if it is, then it is only dependent to the originator (the possessor of the intention).
3.2.3 To accept meaning as the intention is to accept the possibility of a private language. Likewise, all of my utterances would be meaningful (even if they are not communicable).E.g. I can invent words such as Ba and We and utter Ba is We to express the intention Grass is green. Such utterance would be meaningful if this is the case.
3.2.4 However, we cannot accept the possibility of private language because meaningfulness depends on the linguistic community (as previously discussed). And by virtue of the Rule of Inference, Modus Tollens, we could negate that the meaning is the intention (as we have to negate the possibility of private language).
3.3.1 Meaning of an utterance must be the function of such utterance in the linguistic community (or in the communication between the originator and the receiver as the smallest linguistic community is the communication between one originator and one receiver).
3.3.2 To better understand this, think again of the discussion on idioms.
3.3.3 An utterance could have a function (or meaning) in the existence of the following: the utterance and the intention.
3.3.4 Definitely, an utterance would have no meaning if such utterance has not been uttered at all (or in the absence of the utterance). Likewise, there would be no utterance if there has not been an intention (where such utterance is based) at all. Hence, albeit meaning is not the intention, intention is still important in order for an utterance to have a meaning.
3.3.5 But not all utterances have functions. Thus, to speak of functional or meaningful utterances is to speak of utterances that are communicable.
3.3.6 The communicability of an utterance does not depend on the grammatical rules just like in idioms or on the physical possibility of the utterance just like in the statement, Dogs have wings. Again, communicability depends on utterability and understandability.
4. On Partial- and Double- Meaning utterances
4.1.1 Understandability needs further investigation. Where it refers to the ability of the receiver/s to grasp the function being played by the utterance, it could be the case that there could be different interpretations on the function. It could be the case that the receiver might only partially understand the utterance’s function.
4.1.2 This might be similar to Frege’s concept of the sense (only that he argues that the meaning is the referent while I argue that meaning is the function that can be partially understood). Different receivers of an utterance could have a coherent picture of the utterance but their interpretations differ as they have differences in perspectives.
4.2.1 To confuse the receiver/s, there are originators who utter utterances in conversations wherein such utterances do not entirely function as they normally should in a linguistic community (even if originators know the normal function[2] of such utterances).
4.2.2 In such conversations, it could be said that such utterances partially functions their normal function (or that such has a partial function or partial meaning). E.g. On a conversation with a friend, I uttered Thanks as my last word. My intention for such was not to convey the normal function of Thanks, but it would somehow be alright for me if my friend would think of such as the Thanks in its normal function. With such, I am somehow thanking him without indeed thanking him and vice versa.
4.2.3 However, is it really the case that an utterance can partially function (perform) its function? Arguably, it can not.
4.2.4 A single term could have different functions (depending on the linguistic communities that use it). Yet, if this term had already become an utterance (had already been used by the originator in order to communicate), it must have performed only one function. It cannot, when already uttered, function two functions (the normal function on one hand and the function ascribed to it by the originator, on the other) at the same time as it is based only on one whole intention.
4.2.5 Hence, an utterance cannot partially mean (function) its normal meaning (function). If it is not used in its normal sense then its meaning (or the function that it performs) is necessarily the function ascribed to it by the originator. It could not be the case that we partially mean something. We may partially imply something, but not partially mean something. Meaning is not the implication of our utterances, rather the function that it (and that it must) play in a particular linguistic community.
4.2.6 In such manner, my stating of Thanks cannot partially mean that I am thanking and/or partially mean that I am thanking not. Its function must be (one) whole as it is based on one (whole) intention. It could be the case that my stating of Thanks is just a part of my sentence construction in indicating that I respect the one who I’m talking to. In such case, it does not (and can not) mean Thanks in the normal sense. On the contrary, my friend would understand this if we are in the same linguistic community wherein terms such as Thanks and the like do not function as they normally do, but function as a part of sentence construction in respecting a person.
4.2.7 Following the same path, it would be absurd to utter Jokes are half-meant (if we are to take it literally).
4.3.1 The case on what we call partial-meaning statements is similar to the case on double meaning statements. It is often the case that if a person would want an utterance to partially mean something, he ascribes other sort of function to such utterance making that utterance seemingly has double-meaning.
4.3.2 Such is the case wherein the originator wants to implicate more that what is literally said. But as previously argued, meaning is not the implication/s of the utterance. It is simply the utterance’s function.
4.3.2 The intent to have a double-meaning utterance is also due to having more than one intentions. In a case where there is more than one intention, there will also be more than one utterance. E.g. My intentions are: (1) to state that I am happy, and (2) but I am indeed not. My utterances would be: (1) The statement, I am happy, and (2) My manner of saying it sarcastically served as a speech act implying that I am not happy.
4.3.3 Likewise, if the receiver of such utterances does not grasp of the intention I am not happy as he did not notice my manner of saying I am happy sarcastically (or my speech act), it would not make my utterance I am happy meaningless. It may be the case that the function of the utterance I am happy is unknown to him due to his inability to grasp the intention that I simply just want to state such utterance and his inability to notice my second utterance. In such case, the meaning of the utterance I am happy is unknown to him, yet such utterance is still meaningful.
4.3.4 Meaning and meaningful are different. If the meaning is not grasped, it would not mean that it is not meaningful. Meaning or Function is connected to the intention and utterance (and in the existence of other utterances, we would notice that the originator intend not to use the normal function of the utterance). Meaningfulness, however, is connected to the communicability. Meaningfulness is just the capability to have a meaning, not the meaning itself. Inability to grasp the function does not mean that the utterance does not have a function (or able to have a function) in a linguistic community.
4.3.5 It would seem absurd to say that an utterance has a double meaning (just like in the case of green jokes). To suppose that such has would only lead to futile confusions.
5. Defense of the Method of Enquiry
5.1 Albeit the enquiry aims to enquire on the issue of partial- and double- meaning utterances, the Question on meaning and its distinction with the Question on Truth is of necessity to be discussed. It is important to point out that in searching for the real meaning of the so called partial- and double- meaning utterances, we do not necessarily search for the Truthfulness of such utterances.
5.2 It would be preposterous if one would argue against this enquiry and say that my search for the meaning of partial- and double- meaning utterances had lead to the search for its Truth (or Truthfulness). This enquiry is a search for the Truth concerning such utterances, not a search for the meaning/s of such utterances as doing so would mean giving all such utterances as examples and search their real meanings or functions. This work had been a search for the Truth and seeking for the real meaning of certain apparent partial- and double- meaning utterances (through examples) had only served as means to help me search for Truth. Moreover, as I previously stated, the Question on Truth entails the Question on Meaning (but not vice versa).
5.3 Though it is stated that a private language is not possible, others might argue against this work due to my invention of terms such as communicability, utterability, and understandability that might seem as an indicator of a private language. Again, it would be preposterous to do such. Such terms are still anchored and had been explained using the natural language (English language) that would make the linguistic community (the speakers of the natural language) understand such terms. Hence, it is not a case that I am having a private language. My utterances here are capable of being understood by my intended audience (receiver) – the philosophers of language.
6. Since this is a part of my search for Truth: As long as language evolves and as my mind works, albeit this work is done, my enquiry on the nature of meaning would end not.
[1] This utterance had often been used as an example by our group in PHLO 120 class (Philosophical Reasoning) on our discussion on the Philosophy of Language.
[2] How the utterance is normally used in a linguistic community. E.g. kissing the hand of a parent normally functions as a form of respect. To ascribe another function to it is to perform such speech act sarcastically to mean that kissing the hand is a form of disrespect.
No comments:
Post a Comment