A Defense of the Critique / A Critique of the Method

Through the course of this essay, let us focus on Kant’s language and framework and confuse not his views with other systems. It may be the case that disagreements among philosophers lie in their differences in use of language, but they might[1] be just saying the same thing. For the purpose of this essay, let me examine Kant’s view on appearance and reality by dividing it to several points: [P1][2] (Kant argued that) An object has both appearance and reality. [P2] An object’s appearance, which Kant calls as phenomena, is how we perceive such object (how our senses represent the object as it appears to us). [P3] An object’s reality, or the noumena, is that which the object does not give to us (thing-in-itself) that we cannot know. [P4] Following this line of argument, we cannot have a science of Metaphysics or go beyond what is knowable (or phenomenal sphere). These propositions assume the truthfulness of these two: [A1][3] there are limits of our understanding, and [A2] there exists in an object that our understanding cannot grasp. Let me examine all these one by one. Most philosophers would agree that [P1]; only that they would have different definitions of appearance and reality. Husserl, for example, used the terms differently, which actually led him to a conclusion that appearance is not different from reality. Husserl’s concept of appearance is not merely how our senses represent an object in us, but how an object shows itself to us. Hence, if an object shows itself, it shows itself (and thus, there can be no reality beyond our knowledge). However, we cannot just use this view of Husserl in refuting Kant’s because they are using different language. Indeed, their views are not incompatible with each other if both used the same language. Kant argued that nature is a totality of appearances (of how our senses represent nature as it appears to us); Husserl argued that nature is of appearances and reality (of how nature appears to us or how it makes itself appear to us). Husserl does not actually talk of reality as how Kant defines it; he actually does not make an account of that which the object does not show. We will realize that we will do injustice to both theories if we will use one to refute the other, without recognizing their differences in use of terms. Hence, for the analyses of succeeding points, we have to stick to Kant’s use of terms, as the real purpose of this essay is to provide a critique of Kant’s theory. There is no problem that I can observe with [P2]. If we perceive an object, that must be because there is an object that is capable of being perceived. The object must appear to us or must be present before us, which actually made it able of being represented by our senses in us. The dispute actually rises with [P3]. Let me examine it alongside with [A1] and [A2]. I assent to the idea that there are limits of our understanding. Even if it were argued that, it is possible for the human understanding to understand or to comprehend everything, it would not discount that there are indeed limits of human understanding. For to say that it is possible, is not incompatible with saying that we cannot understand and comprehend everything. If understanding is one way of gaining knowledge, and if it is indeed limited, then we are also limited in gaining knowledge. Before we can say that there is in an object that the understanding cannot grasp, we must first account that objects exist in their own right, and this amounts to a rejection of Idealism. Let me, in this essay; argue under the assumption that Idealism is flawed. I believe that I no longer have to prove the flaws of Idealism in this essay as I have done it in my previous work. I would further argue that one cannot argue, “The unperceived cannot exist” because existence is not an accidental feature, rather an essential feature of an object. An object does not exist by virtue of being perceived; an object is perceived by virtue of its having existence. In rejecting Idealism, I do not only wish to reject Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism but also Hegelian Idealism. Hegel’s claim, “The Real is Rational, The Rational is Real” would be true if “everything is knowable”, wherein the use of “is” is not of predication, but of identity and where all members of “everything” are members of “knowable” and vice-versa. It would be absurd to say that “is” in “everything is knowable” is only of predication, because the group “knowable” cannot be a group larger than “everything”. If “knowable” is larger than “everything”, we can say that “nothing”, which is not part of “everything”, is knowable. However, this is a logical impossibility because we cannot grant existence to “nothing”; “nothing” is simply the non-existence of anything. The claim, “The Real is Rational, The Rational is Real” may only be true under two conditions: (1) if reality is constructed by mind, and (2) if “everything is knowable”. Since I have already rejected the former (as I have rejected Subjective Idealism in my previous work), we are now left with (2). Hegel’s claim would be saved if it is true, and this would totally reject Kant’s concept of noumena and limits of knowledge. However, we may again ask whether “everything is knowable”. As previously argued, I do not think so. I am more inclined to think that there are limits of the understanding. Furthermore, if it is true, it may be because either the reality is constructed or the reality is outside of us (which is knowable). If reality is constructed, it follows that we can comprehend the whole of reality because it is just a creation of mind; but as I have rejected it beforehand, we are left with the latter – that the reality, which is outside of us, is knowable. This is extremely absurd; how can we know the whole outside reality if in comprehending the world, we use sensation, which we cannot doubt as capable of being flawed? I would say that the analysis of human structure itself would lead us to knowing that we cannot comprehend everything. Hence, there is something in reality, which we cannot grasp. Now that I have defended assumptions [A1] and [A2], it seems that proposition [P3] is also true; for if we combine the two assumptions ([A1] that there are limits of the understanding and [A2] that there is in an object that we cannot grasp) it logically follows that we have to accept that there is “noumena” (the thing-in-itself). If one is not yet persuaded with my arguments, consider this one: In analyzing the question whether there exists noumena, one can only say that he either knows the answer or that he does not know the answer. Certainly, there must only be one answer to the question, which is either “yes” (there exists noumena) or “no” (there is no noumena). If one happens to say that he does not know the answer, this already proves that an unknowable exists (i.e. the answer to the question exists). If one happens to say that he knows the answer, it does not follow that he really knows the true answer. He might just be assuming that he knows. If we say that, we cannot be sure or that we cannot actually know the answer to “Does noumena exist?” because if there is, it is unknowable, we are actually saying that the unknowable (i.e. the answer to the question) actually exists, as there cannot be no answer to the question. Lastly, [P4] or that “there can be no science of Metaphysics (beyond phenomena)” is a good account because we actually cannot claim the certainty of our knowledge of the unknowable. We cannot even have knowledge of the unknowable. What we can only have are mere interpretations of those that are beyond the limits of human understanding. This is where I actually find Kant’s absurdity in his writings; he himself studied what is beyond the limits of human reason and talked of metaphysical concepts. Furthermore, though I hold that there is a phenomena-noumena distinction, Kant’s philosophy offers a problem on how we are to know whether we are going beyond the phenomenal realm and are already interpreting the noumenal realm[4]. Kant may be saying that he is merely giving accounts of the capacities of our understanding in his Critique of Pure Reason and that this is just a matter of giving an account of the phenomena. However, his Critique talks of abstract concepts, which actually seem to be just products of his interpretation of the noumenal realm. [1] The term “might” signifies that I am not stating that philosophers are indeed (only) saying the same thing. [2] P = proposition [3] A = assumption [4] that we cannot know whether we are already interpreting the noumenal realm or just making an account of the phenomenal realm proves that noumena (i.e. the answer to this issue) exists.

Warrantless Self-Evidence: Anti-Foundationalist Stance on Logic

warrantless self-evidence: anti-foundationalist stance on logic

Institutionalization of Moral Theory

A Conceptual Analysis of Law


Law has, undoubtedly, a significant role in the life of each person in the society. In its intention to preserve order, the society would have to create a system by which it would regulate the actions of its people. The creation of such regulation manifests a society's act of protecting the general welfare from possible harms that anyone might perform. This sort of regulation marks the existence of law in the society.[1]

The "law" that has been discussed in the previous paragraph, which is also the focus of this analysis, is taken in a broad sense and does not refer to specific laws or to mere statutes. The object of this conceptual analysis is to make an account of the law itself. We cannot, at this point, make an account of the very nature of law; but creation of such an account is the object of this analysis. Our aim is to penetrate the very essence of the law itself.

The account on the general nature of law that must be created should not be too limiting. It must not be confined to a specific system of law, e.g., criminal law, but must encompass all that are taken as systems of law. In such case, we have to look at and analyze law not from the point of view of a particular legal system. Because we cannot initially define law, the suggestion is that we find the essence of the law through an analysis and an understanding of how the law came to be.

It would be useful for us to consider the two features of law, which, though vague, would provide some help. As noted earlier, law is marked by the presence of society's regulation of its people's actions. This shows the first feature of law as a system of social control. It assigns one an obligation to do things that he would otherwise not do, or an obligation to not do things that he would otherwise do.[2] To define law as simply a system of social control, however, is problematic. There are also other systems that could serve as social control. Hence, we have to make an account of what sort of social control the law is, and we could do such if we could account for the essential aspect of law.

The second feature of law is its prescriptive or normative character. It orders one to act in a particular manner and not simply describe how things are. This is what makes the sort of law, which is the object of this analysis, different from the sort of laws discussed in sciences. Laws that are discussed in science, e.g., laws of motion, are descriptive. The law that we are discussing here has a normative character. However, there are also other systems that could be considered as normative. In such case, our account of law must explain how it gains its normative character and what sort of actions it prescribes or proscribes.

The thesis that will be defended is that the law is an institutionalized moral theory. This proposition could make an account on how the law came to be, whose analysis could provide us with a proper account on the nature of law. This proposition explains that the law exists when a moral theory has reached acceptance and institutionalization. Likewise, this proposition could definitely make an account of the two previously discussed features. The prescriptive character of law, which makes it a system of social control, is due to the institutionalization of an accepted moral theory. The moral theory that is characterized by voluntary compliance or moral obligation to certain actions would be characterized with a coerced compliance or legal obligation when it is institutionalized as a system that must govern the conducts in the society.

The account on law as an institutionalized moral theory must not be misconstrued as an account that law is identical with morality. What the case is is different from what the case ought to be. Those that are legal does not necessarily mean that they are morally right. In such case, I do not assent to the idea that "an unjust law is not a law" or that "an immoral law is not a law," for it may be the case that there is a society that adopts statutes, that we would deem as unjust and/or immoral.

Likewise, the account on law as an institutionalized moral theory must not be misconstrued as an appeal to the idea that "moral validity is a prerequisite for legal validity," which is a characteristic of Classical Natural Theory. It is true that what the case is is different from what the case ought to be. But this does not necessarily mean that the "is" is necessarily connected with the "ought," because there is a middle ground, which is the "wish." What the case is and what the case ought to be are both different from what we wish to be the case. What we wish to be the case is the middle ground between what is legally accepted and what is morally right (such is if there really is an Absolute Morality that tells us what ought to be the case).

It is often mistaken that what we wish to be the case is the same with what the case ought to be. Such is because it is construed that when man indeed knows what the case ought to be, then he would wish that the legal system must be anchored on what the case ought to be. There is, however, a great difference between them. What the case ought to be is dictated by Morality. If there is an Absolute Morality, then what the case ought to be is unchangeable and independent of any human considerations. It does not depend on our wants or on any wishes one has regarding the route the legal system must take. What we wish to be the case, on the other hand, is dependent on how we want the legal system to be, whether or not this want directly captures what is being dictated by Morality/morality. It is, thus, merely dependent on our judgments on how things should be, and not on how the things should be.

The difference between the three - the is, the ought to be, and the wished to be, is better explained through an example. Let us use the employment or threat of force by states in the international arena as our example. The United Nations Charter, which is a legitimate source of International Law, gives its member states the right to wage a war as a sort of collective self-defense. Article 51 of the UN Charter states "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence [sic] if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations…."[3] This granting of 'inherent' right to the member states through Article 51 of the UN Charter describes the "is," or what the current legal system provides. The "wished to be" is the principle embraced by Article 51, which is the existence of inherent right to individual and collective self-defense. The waging of war as a sort of self-defense is anchored on the assumption of "just war,"[4] which allows for the deliberate use of force and even of killing in cases wherein the interest of the state or society is at stake.

The "ought to be" in the given example, is yet unknown. There are those that might argue that the wished to be is what's ought to be - that we wish to be allowed to wage war due to collective self-defense because we indeed ought to be allowed to wage war due to collective self-defense. However, the assumption that there is an inherent right to self-defense is different from whether there really is an inherent right to self-defense. Corollarily, the assumption that we must be allowed to wage war is different from whether we must indeed be allowed to wage war. Hence, the distinction between what we wish to be the case and what ought to be the case can be outlined as the distinction between the assumption on what is morally right and wrong and what is indeed morally right and wrong. As previously noted, what we wish to be the case is just dependent on our judgments, while what the case ought to be is independent of our judgments.

This analysis, though talks about the relationship between law and a moral theory, does not deal with what the case ought to be (Morality) and what we wish the case ought to be (what the correct moral theory should be). Whether there is indeed an Absolute Morality is not a concern of this analysis. The concern is on the assumption on what is morally right and wrong; and there may be an assumption on what is morally right and wrong with or without an existence of an Absolute Morality. This analysis aims to make a description of what the law essentially is, through an analysis of how it came to be - an analysis of how law is institutionalized as a sort of formalization of an accepted moral theory.

In making an account on how the law came to be, we must recognize that the "law is intimately related to the social complex in which it has developed."[5] Law is something more than what J. L. Austin argues as the command of the sovereign. It is the case that there is an aspect of habitual obedience in law as he has noted. However, there is more to law than just the command of the sovereign to its inferiors. We must take note of what sort of law the sovereign creates and what sort of guide the sovereign has in its creation of statutes. This could be done through an analysis of the social complex where the law has developed.

Likewise, as H. L. A. Hart has argued, Austin's command theory of the sovereign fails to account for the continuity and persistence of law even in the succession of different legislators.[6] When the sovereign, who is the legislator, has died, the law that he has created would not die with him. It is not even the case that when the legislator has died, the succeeding legislator has a tacit command of what was previously created as commands (laws) of the former legislator. There is more to law than just a command.

In such case, the theory that we must create must account for the idea that the law functions as a sort of social control, a term that seems more suited than command. The term command, as used by Austin, is composed of [1] desire, and [2] the capacity to impose sanction for the dissatisfaction of such desire.[7] Social control, on the other hand, does not necessitate the existence of imposition of sanction, which may not be present in cases in the system of contract law. Furthermore, with social control, we are not merely referring to the imposition of certain restrictions on human actions, which are created through sanctions. Control may restrain certain conduct such as rape, murder, etc. But it may also enlarge certain conducts through the enlargement of personal freedoms through the protection of free press, speech, etc. In such case, more than just looking at the command the sovereign creates, we have to examine how the law came to be and/or how the sovereign or (to put it rightly) the legislator create statutes.

Hart's account on law as the system of primary and secondary rules does account for the continuity and persistence of law. The secondary rules, or the rules about primary rules, create powers and authorities by which primary rules (the very rules that tell the people how to act) are validated, created and adjudicated. However, to explain law as merely a system of primary and secondary rules is to fail to make an account on how primary and secondary rules are created. Secondary rules only provides for a system by which rules can be created, validated and adjudicated, but not a system by which rules are actually created. The distinction between primary and secondary rules is only able to explain how the law works and becomes valid. It only explains the workings and/or structure of the legal system by showing us its internal (primary rules) and external structure (secondary rules). However, this approach to law, would fail to explain how the law came to be if it does not explain the content of the law - the very reason why the law is created. This approach of Hart explains how the law can be created through its structure (that can be seen internally and externally through primary and secondary rules), but not how the law is actually created, which can be explained by referring to the content of the law.

As to the content of law, Hart argues for a necessary overlap between law and morality. He argues that the two are concerned with the same issues and problems. He calls this the "Minimum Content" theory of Natural Law. The overlap is only at a minimal level because though they deal with the same problems, they deal with these problems differently.[8]

I concur with the assertion of minimum content theory that morality and law deals with the same problems. However, the overlap is not between law and morality or the "is" and the "ought." The overlap that exists is the overlap between law and the legislator's moral judgment - an overlap between the "is" and the "wish." This idea should not be interpreted as a concession to natural law theory because this is not a construal that moral validity precedes legal validity. The only requisite for legal validity is the institutionalized acceptance of a moral theory. This does not mean that the moral theory must be the correct one (if there really is a correct moral theory).

After analyzing Austin's and Hart's theories and after recognizing the lacking features of their theories, we must now go back to our assertion on how the law came to be - that it has a relation to the social complex wherein which it has developed. We must look at law as the product of the society. It is a social means to a social end. This social end is dependent on the society's sense or understanding of what is right.

People in the society have intuitive feelings about what is right and what is wrong. This does not mean that they have innate knowledge of morality. This simply means that the society provides them the environment by which they are accustomed to certain beliefs and hence, certain sense of what is right. Law, then, can be seen as a product of a collective belief of the people in the society. With this, it could be said that the true test of law is not its authoritative source (or the sovereign that gives commands) but its conformity to what the society has accepted as morally right.

One may counter this idea by pointing to the existence of laws or statutes in a society that the people of such society consider as unjust or immoral. It may be argued that in an authoritarian state, the ruler may create statutes that are binding to his people even if these people do not consider the statutes as moral. However, though it is true that the ruler, who is also the legislator, may create statutes that the people deem as immoral, this does not mean that there exists no institutionalization of a moral theory. The statutes that the ruler has created are formalizations of the moral theory that he upholds. Since he is the legislator, he has the monopoly of the creation of statutes, which he could use in order to advance his sense of what is right.

If this is the case, one may again counter by saying that law is merely dependent on its authoritative source, which is, in this case, the ruler that created statutes that seem immoral for his people. This might contradict the view that the law is dependent on the society's sense of what is right. However, in analyzing law, we must analyze the system of law, and not the particular laws or statutes (or decrees). The statutes that appear immoral to the people may continue to exist, but if it is the system of law itself that the people see as immoral, such system of law will perish. In the given example, the people, though may be against the particular statutes that the ruler has created, are not against the law itself (or the system of law that such society embraces). The people's continued acceptance of authoritarianism and its corollaries is a sort of acceptance of a moral theory - a moral theory that gives paramount authority to the ruler and gives compliance to the corollaries of such sort of authoritarianism. The sense of right in such society can be seen in the acceptance of authoritarianism. And as long as the people accept this moral theory that allows for this sort of authoritarianism, the legal system will have its continuance and persistence. It is the people's acceptance that legitimizes the law or the legal system. This proves the point that the true test of law is its conformity to the society's sense of what is right.

In the previous example, the moral theory that the society adopts is institutionalized due to such society's (the assemblage of its people) acceptance of it. This institutionalization is that which gives the law, which is a product of this institutionalization of a moral theory, its prescriptive character that makes it a system of social control. People ought to act in accordance to their sense of right.

It may be the case, however, that not all people in the society assent to the moral theory that is institutionalized. In such case, the moral theory that is adopted and whose compliance to it is formalized through the creation of law is that of the moral theory that the legislator wishes to promote. It may be the case that the legislator indeed upholds the moral theory, or it may be the case that the legislator only wishes to promote the moral theory due to the demand of the majority. What is clear in this case is that the law itself is created through an institutionalization of certain moral judgments that is adopted by those who created the law. Law, here, can be seen as the product of culture in the sense that it is dependent on the moral theory that the society (or at least the legislators in the society) upholds. Law can also be seen as the means for advancing culture - a means for advancing the moral theory that seeks to be formalized (through the compliance of the people). The special role of the legislator in creating statutes and his privilege to advance his personal moral judgments does not point to the paramount significance of authoritative source in making an account of the essential nature of law. As aforementioned, the true test of law is the continued acceptance of the people. If vast majority would want to change the law as it no longer conforms to their sense of right, the old law will perish and will be replaced with a new one.

This account on law is better understood through examples. The laws or statutes in the Nazi Germany had received a widespread disavowal not only from Germans but also from different parts of the world, which lead to the formation of the United Nations and of the UN Charter. UN Charter sets new standards, which manifests a moral theory that differs from those of the Nazis.

During the time of Hitler, the statutes were not initially seen or considered as immoral by its people. In fact, they accepted the moral theory that Hitler, then, advocated. Nazis theorized that they (Germans) are a superior race. This view serves as the moral justification of their hatred towards other races, especially the Jews. The Nazi Movement was then the largest party in Germany. It, as well as the moral theory that it advocated, received popular support from Germans. Such sort of moral theory that affirms their superiority was what the Germans needed during those times when Germany encountered oppressive economic and political problems due to Treaty of Versailles. The statutes in Nazi Germany were all anchored on this moral theory that argues for the superiority of the German race.

The widespread valuation of human rights, however, condemned Nazis' racial actions. The UN Charter, which is binding to all its member states including Germany, manifests a moral theory different from that of the Nazis. UN affirms the equality among men, regardless of gender and race. UN Charter, as a sort of an institutionalized moral theory receives widespread acceptance that further legitimizes the adoption of such moral theory. The demise of the laws of Nazi Germany is due to the change in values of its people, which is also affected by the demands of other countries for Germany to withdraw its "barbaric"[9] acts towards other races.
The laws of other countries may seem primitive to one who defends a western view of law. India, for example, had a caste system, which has a religious / moral background. Such system is dependent on how they wish to be the case (or on how they assume the case ought to be). China had a law that castigates the suspects that are not yet proven guilty. Such is because this law is anchored on the moral theory that is accepted and institutionalized in their society, the theory that "one is guilty until proven innocent," a theory different from what the UN Charter upholds.

Here, we could see the capability of the law to advance culture or (to put it more appropriately) moral theory. India and China were / are only two of the countries that embrace a different culture and hence different moral judgments towards different problems. But because UN Charter is binding to its member states, UN Charter serves as a system of social control by which India and China were forced to conform to the moral theory that is being embraced and institutionalized. The leaders and citizens of India and China may opt not to conform to UN Charter, which is a set of institutionalized or formalized moral judgments about particular issues. However, the institutionalization of an international law would lead to the widespread valuation of the moral theory that is being embraced or assumed by such international law. Citizens of India and China might indeed think that they do have inherent rights as being provided for by UN Charter. The demand of their citizens, as well as the pressure of the international community would make these countries conform to what was institutionalized. It is not that they are merely conforming, they are doing so because they see the UN Charter as appealing. Upon seeing UN Charter as appealing, they support the continuance and persistence of UN Charter through an acceptance of the moral theory wherein which UN Charter is anchored.

The previous examples show that law is simply an institutionalized moral theory. It is not anchored on self-evident moral principles, but merely on people's judgments. The legal system or what the case is is not anchored on what the case ought to be but merely on what we wish to be the case, which can also be stated as what we assume to be the case.



[1] A society's act of regulating the actions of its people through certain statutes marks the existence of law. However, these statutes need not be for the general welfare in order to be called a law. What makes these statutes part of the law is their ability to regulate or control the people and not their ability to promote the general welfare.
[2] Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jules L. Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence (USA: Westview Press, Inc., 1990), p. 6.
[3] Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed., (US: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2003) p. 700 - 701.
[4] The phrase "just war" is borrowed from St. Augustine
[5] Carlton Clymer Rodee et al., Introduction to Political Science, 4th ed., Asian Student Edition, (McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1983) p. 57.
[6] Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jules L. Coleman, Philosophy of Law: An Introduction to Jurisprudence, p. 24.
[7] Ibid., p. 21.
[8] Ibid., p. 38.
[9] The term "barbaric" is often used by those who condemn the Holocaust or the attempt of the Nazis to kill all of the Jews in Europe, as well as those they deem as undesirable.

Justified Elitism

Science is just one among different belief systems or systems of knowledge. It is said to be a belief system or a system of knowledge by virtue of its accounts regarding (or descriptions of) phenomena. It is just one among many systems that seek to make an explanation of the world. Other belief systems, though create their own explanation of the world, use different approaches and presuppose different assumptions, which are in accordance to the beliefs that these systems uphold. Myths and superstitions, for example, take different approach in explaining phenomena. Their construal of phenomena is dependent on the accounts of people whose speculations regarding the phenomena in question did not undergo examinations. The believers of these belief systems embrace the mere speculative accounts regarding phenomena as though they are self-evidently true. Science is taught to us since primary education as a system that explains phenomena or the world in a different manner - a manner that is not anchored on mere speculations but on accounts regarding the world that are warranted by evidences.

However, the education that the society provides regarding these belief systems does more than just teaching us the idea that science is backed-up by evidences while others are not. The education that there is creates a ruling out of other belief systems as reliable sources of knowledge. In certain cases wherein ruling out is not employed, the education that there is creates a hierarchy of reliability of the sources of knowledge (or belief systems that provide explanation of the world). At the topmost of this hierarchy is science. In such case, if the beliefs that are being upheld by other belief systems are to be ever authorized as reliable knowledge, then a certification from science is often sought. Religion often times explains its teachings through making an appeal to science. There are theologians who would explain teachings in the bible through backing up with scientific studies. In such case, their teachings would be appealing to the skeptics. There are also myths and/or superstitions that are explained through making them appear scientific. Fortune telling, through referring to the positioning of the stars, is sometimes referred to by others as scientific. This is what others call "the science of astrology." Scientific community, however, calls this a pseudo-science.

But why is science given such paramount importance? Why do most people make an appeal to science in warranting their claims? Such is because of the education (or shall I say, "miseducation," if I would ever be allowed to invent and use such word) that we receive regarding science. Science is taught as if its laws (e.g., laws of motion) are self-evidently true. Scientific facts are almost taken as synonymous with scientific laws. Scientific laws are taken as if they are indeed a mirror image of the world. However, such is not the case. Science does appeal to empirical evidences in explaining phenomena. But this does not make science create a flawless account of what the world actually is. To take scientific laws as self-evident would be the same as to accept myths and superstitions as self-evident. In this case, both are merely accepted simply because they are taught to us as reliable sources of knowledge. The only difference is, the sources of scientific teachings have big names and often times, have degrees received from reputable universities, while those of the myths and superstitions do not.

The previous paragraph does not intend to mean that science and other systems of knowledge stands in equal footing with each other. I do not even wish such to be the case. However, if science were to be given with a higher regard, such should not be because of the beliefs that it upholds. These beliefs are not self-evident. Even science does not profess that these beliefs are self-evident. It does not brag for the certainty of its beliefs. If science were to be taken as a reliable source of knowledge solely by virtue of the reliability (due to appeal to self-evidence) of its beliefs, it would be reduced to a "mere act of faith." The reliability of science must be attributed not to its beliefs but to the approach that it takes in order to arrive at its beliefs.

Paul Feyerabend would oppose this idea by claiming that science has no monopoly in the production of reliable knowledge. The world is a "largely unknown entity," and hence there is no single way of looking at the world and no uniform way of explaining the phenomena that occur. In such case, there is no right approach in dealing with knowledge of the world. His account on the existence of different approaches is appealing, but his theoretical anarchism is, however, unacceptable.

Surely, there are different approaches in explaining the world. Each of them has a pragmatic value to its believers. Even science has no single method. Scientists, throughout the ages, use different methods in arriving at their theories. Some of the methods are Bacon's Inductivism, Newton's Hypothetico-Deductivism and Popper's Falsificationalism. These various scientific methods, however, have a unifying feature, which serves as the "approach" of science in dealing with the world. These are methods that are under a single approach - the employment of empirical testability. The existence of different methods shows the plausibility of anarchism within the realm of science. However, anarchism outside science or anarchism in terms of choosing for the more reliable source of knowledge (or belief system) is untenable.

Putting the various methods of science in equal footing is acceptable but doing the same to belief systems is not. The common feature among various scientific methods, which is the employment of empirical testability (which serves as the approach of science), allows for the elimination of the unobservable from the observable. The elimination of the unobservable is important because they cannot serve as evidences for the beliefs that are being upheld. Other systems do not employ such empirical testability and are not concerned with the elimination of the unobservable. It does not matter for these systems if their beliefs are unverifiable and/or unobservable. What matters is that the beliefs that they uphold are believed. They are "mere acts of faith." Though it can be argued that science also takes a leap of faith, it does so by relying on evidences. Thus, even if science takes a leap of faith, it is not merely an act of faith. It is thus through the existence of evidences that science is able to gain its reliability.

The empirical testability that there is opens the door for intersubjective certification, which means that we can verify the claims of science and see, through our own observations, whether these claims are indeed anchored on evidences and not on mere speculations. One might say that this is elitism in favor of science. Such sort of elitism, however, is allowable. For those who cannot accept things simply because they are and take that there must be reasons by which things are, evidence is a must. As I have stated in one of my essays, this is a matter of evidences versus mere act of faith, and those who side with evidences side with science.

On The Role of The Method

Science is regarded and introduced to students as a systematic study of knowledge. The relevant sense of "systematic" is due to science’s acquisition of knowledge through a reliable method. Such reliable method is argued as capable of yielding reliable knowledge - knowledge that has high probability of being true.

It is commonly argued that science’s main purpose is to create laws and/or theories to explain and predict phenomena by observing regularities in nature. Such empirical observation of regularities seeks to discover/uncover the underlying uniformities (among phenomena) in nature. If science is a systematic study of knowledge (that uses a reliable method), we can say that science is only one among approaches to acquisition of knowledge (of the world). It is just that science does so by focusing on observable phenomena, which serves as its focal point of investigation, and uses a purported reliable method to establish the veracity of the explanation and prediction regarding the observation on such observable phenomena.

This purported reliable method, or scientific method, includes stating the problem regarding a phenomenon, collecting pertinent data through observation and/or measurement, formulating hypotheses, testing these hypotheses, and finally, forming a conclusion, which later on would be established as a theory after the adequate testing and acceptance of the scientific community. According to Yogesh Malhotra, science is distinct because of its "intersubjective certification," where its being empirical allows other investigators ascertain the truth of a scientific explanation.

It is by virtue of this "intersubjective certification" that we can see the value of scientific method. Science rests on empirical testability. Even if one argues that all knowledge claims are tentative and subject to revision, scientific claims could be argued as grounded on evidences that we (can) test because they are empirical. Scientific claims are, therefore, not mere belief but beliefs that are justified by (empirical) evidences. This is what makes one argue that science yields reliable knowledge (scientific claims) through a reliable method (scientific method).

Another purpose of the scientific method could be seen in its dullness. The dullness and simplicity of science is a mark of a careful analysis of nature or the world. Robert Pirsig, in his Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, stated "The real purpose of scientific method is to make sure Nature hasn't misled you into thinking you know something you don't actually know." Scientific method allows us to separate other unobservable alternatives from the observable ones, which serve as the focal point of investigation in science. This simplification allows us to have a careful examination of the phenomenon in question.

Even if one argues that science does not brag that it rests on certainty and maintains that it rather rests on empirical testability, which makes it a reliable source of reliable knowledge, it, as well as its purported reliable method, is not free from criticisms. Paul Feyerabend’s theoretical anarchism argues that science does not have a monopoly in yielding a reliable knowledge; that science cannot brag that its empirical testability makes it the most reliable source of knowledge.

Feyerabend’s critique of science’s consistency criterion (consistency in terms of theories), is, at some point, similar to other scientists’ accounts in their defense of science. It yields account similar to other scientists that question not the reliability and uniformity of scientific method - the account that there can be rival theories in science and we must not, of necessity, deny the new theory that is inconsistent with the old one, because the new one may yield a better explanation of the phenomenon in question than the old one. We must take into consideration that scientific method does not necessarily mean an appeal to the consistency criterion, because it may be established, through the scientific method, that the new theory that is inconsistent with the old one yields a better explanation of the phenomenon in question.

It is the case, however, that Feyerabend’s denial of consistency criterion is not due to the emergence of new evidence that may falsify the old idea/theory, but mainly due to his anarchistic approach on the acquisition of knowledge. He argues that there is no single method that we can say as reliable in acquiring knowledge. He is skeptic of the idea that empirical approach is the best approach in acquiring knowledge. He argues that this is just one of the many approaches, but this does not make it the best.

This construal is a corollary of how Feyerabend views the world. He views the world as a "largely unknown entity." Our want to explore this "largely unknown entity" cannot be satisfied by a single method of looking at it. There is no single way of looking at the world, and thus no method can claim the throne of the best approach into acquiring knowledge. Saying that one is more reliable is elitism without being certain that such is indeed more reliable because the world is a large entity that we cannot fully understand.

Positing that science has such a uniform method is, according to Feyerabend, only to simplify the aim of scientific education to simplify science and to make it appear objective. It seeks to separate science’s domain of research from others so that science could have a language and logic of its own. Science’s focal point of investigation is isolated from other fields to make scientific facts appear as independent of opinions/interpretations, though they, in fact, unavoidably/inevitably are. Science’s elimination of other alternative options of looking into nature or the world is an unjustified elitism. As noted, there is no single way of looking at the world.

Feyerabend asserted that it is possible to create such a tradition that excludes itself from other disciplines or other approaches into acquisition of knowledge - that it is possible for science to exclude itself from other disciplines and be held by strict rules. But he also asserted that this tradition is not desirable as it inhibits progress. He believes that progress is only possible when there is a free market of ideas, not when there is a monopoly of a single and uniform method. Feyerabend, then, construes progress in science as brought about by no single method, but by a free market of ideas.

Feyerabend’s criticism of a single and uniform method in science establishes certain great points. First, it explains to us that a single and uniform scientific method, which is taught to us in schools, is (or may not be) the best approach in acquiring knowledge of the world. It explains to us that no single method, or even science itself, cannot brag us of itself as the best approach in understanding the world. Second, it explains to us that science cannot be purely objective due to the simplification that it does (due to scientific method). It explains that scientific facts are essentially affected by (established) theories. However, I deem of his criticism as unable of refuting the reliability of the scientific method.

The two points stated in the previous paragraph may be also believed by one who does not deny the reliability of the scientific method. We may say that scientific method is not the best method because we consider that there might be a better method of acquiring knowledge. But we may also say this while arguing that scientific method is more reliable that yields more reliable results than mere speculations about phenomena. We may say that science is not purely objective because objectivity and certainty is not among the goals of science. Its simplification through elimination of alternative options (or separation of unobservable matters) from that of observable matters is a matter of weighing evidences. Science seeks to eliminate the unobservable as it cannot serve as evidence or proof for our belief about the world. Scientific method shows us how things are and gives us evidences for our beliefs. It is opposed to other approaches of dealing with knowledge such as witchcraft, superstitions, voodoo, etc. that takes beliefs as if they were self-evidently true. For those who take that things are not just because they are, who take that there must be reasons by which things are, evidence is a must. This evidence cannot be seen in a mere act of faith. Even though we may say that scientific method is not the best approach, it provides us with evidences that we desire. And as long as we accept these evidences as reasons for how things in nature are, as long as we believe these evidences as proofs of our beliefs about nature or the world, we cannot throw away the notion of reliability of the scientific method.

It is a matter of evidences versus mere act of faith. Those who side with evidences, side with science and the scientific method.

For-itself-for-others

(a summary of Sartre's being-for-Others)

Before going on to the discussion of the relation of the I to the Other, it is necessary to explain the I and its Being. It must be noted that the I (I) as a being is different from Being. The I as a being is an entity; the Being is the Being of this being (or could be better understood as the essence of this being) and is not an entity. So the I (or I) has (have) a Being, which has a structure. We must enquire now on the structure of the I’s Being.

There are structures of Being, which are not beings themselves. The being-in-itself is a Being that is immanent; it has a defined end and is already complete. It has no possibilities and thus, has no freedom. The being-for-itself, on the other hand, is incomplete. It has no defined end, is fluid and is always in the state of coming-to-be. This being-for-itself is the structure of the I’s Being. The I is free and it can choose among any of its possibilities. The for-itself’s relation to the in-itself could be revealed in the presence of the Other.

If through the Other’s look, I am objectified and reduced to my factual existence, I am reduced to an in-itself. With this, as a for-itself, my Being tries to reclaim its freedom through escaping its factual existence, i.e. its being in-itself (where the in-itself is not the foundation of its being). In this flight, its also pursues the impossible future wherein it would be an in-itself-for-itself, i.e. the in-itself would be the foundation of its own. The for-itself is thus a flight and a pursuit. It flees its being in-itself and at the same time pursues it. It is a pursued-pursuing.[1] Here, the I is said to be “not what it is and is what it is not”. It is not what it is because it (the for-itself) is not the in-itself (its facticity); it is not what it is not because it is its possibilities that it pursues (that it is not). The I is its own nothingness. It is not its facticity (its past and present) and not even the future that it pursues.

So if there are Others, it must be noted that they are also free and also in the state of becoming. An Other is also his own nothingness. The structure of the Being of the Other is the same with the structure of the Being of the I because the Other is also a self like the I. I cannot escape from dealing with Others because I am not the foundation of my own facticity – of my own existence. Being-for-Others is a consequence of being thrown into this world.

The Other appears to me through the “Look”. “In every look, there is the appearance of the Other-as-object a concrete and probable presence in my perceptive field.”[2] The look makes me realize that I am not alone in this world – that I exist for all men. So it is not the existence of the Other that is dubitable because the Other is everywhere. What is questionable is its being there – or whether I really am seen from where I am; but the existence of the Other should not be questioned because he exists. Even in the Other’s absence, we will recognize that the Other exists, because in the first place, we will not say that a person is absent if he does not exist. Absence must not be understood as not being there. Absence is “a bond between two or several human realities”, which requires the presence of these realities to each other. Hence, it is in Other’s relation to me that I can say that he is absent (and this necessitates his existence). If this is so (that he is everywhere), then I am always looked-at.

When it comes to the object of the look, there is the “being-looked-at” and the “being-looking-at”. Let us try to examine the I as being-looked-at.

If I am being-looked-at, I am the one objectified, and as previously stated, the one reduced to an in-itself when the Other has already defined me the way he wanted. As a looked-at, I appear only as a presence to the Other as he makes me as his object. In his act of looking at me, though there is a distance between us, he experiences my distanceless presence to him. This is because his attention is focused on me as a presence in his perceptive field; because he makes me as his object. If I happen to recognize that I am being-looked-at, I would recognize the Other’s infinite freedom that limits my own freedom. I know that as a for-itself, I have possibilities; but because the Other projects his own possibilities in me and because he has already made a definition of me that is outside of me, my possibilities become limited. My possibilities are reduced into probabilities. I am no longer free to choose among the possibilities that I used to have because the Other limits this freedom. With the Other’s look, he is the master of the situation and I am his slave.

As a looked-at, I could have subjective reactions to the Other’s look. I could feel shame or the feeling that I have “fallen into the world” in that which I need the Other’s mediation in order for me to be me. I could also feel fear or the discovery of myself as being threatened because of being a presence in this world. This fear is a flight and is not an authentic attitude toward the look. Sartre asserted that there are two authentic subjective attitudes toward the look. First is the shame that made me recognize the Other as a subject for whom I am an object. Second is the arrogance that made me affirm my freedom by confronting the Other. Here, I apprehend myself as a free object and that I could make the Other as my object.

Now, let us say, I want to reclaim my freedom. As a being-looked-at, I would try to negate that situation wherein I will become the subject, and the Other as object. This is the internal negation and the sort of negation that a for-itself must have. This internal negation negates the external negation wherein I am the one who is the object of the Other. Here, the Me-as-object will strive to become Me-as-subject so that the Other-as-subject will become the Other-as-object. This objectivation of the Other is a defense on my part as a for-itself to reclaim my freedom. The Me-as-subject becomes the limit of the freedom of the Other-as-object. I now become the master of the situation.

Being an object-being-for-others or subject-being-for-others is dependent on who conceives it. The nature of the look depends on how I apprehend the situation – on whether I am the one looked-at or looking-at. The look makes me recognize that I also am (other than a for-itself) a being-for-Others. The Other and the I are co-responsible for each other’s existence. Though we are not the foundation of our existences, we are responsible for our Beings. I claim the Me-as-object or Me-as-subject as mine, The Other claims the Other-as-object or Other-as-subject as his. We exist for each other and each of us carries the world as consequence of being abandoned as free beings in this world. These things are made clear to us through the look. The look made clear to us that we are not alone – that others are everywhere.

Hence, the fundamental relation of the I to the Other, is being-for-Others. This being-for-Others is “not an ontological structure of a for-itself” because it (for-Others) is not derived from it (for-itself). But as aforementioned, the cogito will reveal to us that our being as a man is not only a for-itself but also for-Others. The for-itself would not be a man if it were not a for-Others. It must be recognized that there are Others and as thrown into the world, we are condemned to be here with Others. My being that is revealed to me, then, is a for-itself-for-others.

[1] Chapter 3: Concrete relations with Others, Part 3: Being-for-Others, Being and Nothingness
[2] Part 4: The Look, Being and Nothingness

On Descriptions and On Referring

The purpose of this essay is not actually to create a theory on Truth and Meaning or to discuss my own view on language. My aim is actually twofold: (1) to examine Russell’s and Strawson’s accounts on Meaningfulness and Truthfulness of a proposition, and (2) to show their strengths and weaknesses so that I can make an account on which among the two is more acceptable.

Russell and Strawson have opposing views concerning meaningfulness and truthfulness of a proposition. The former holds a referential theory of meaning. The latter holds that meaning is dependent on context and convention. The main difference is that the former believes that the meaning is solely dependent on the referent while the latter believes that the meaning is dependent on how a statement is used by the speaker who uttered it.

The referential theory of meaning is not actually discussed on Russell’s Descriptions, but his essay implies that he believes this. He implicitly asserted that the term “unicorn” in the statement “I met a unicorn” has its meaning that could be seen in its referent, which is not an actual unicorn but a “concept of unicorn”. He further argued that the analysis must not be that of grammar, but that of logic; where logic considers “a robust sense of reality” as necessary. Hence, every word must be capable of having a sense of reality (be compared with reality) in order for it to become meaningful.

One may misinterpret Russell and think that he does not consider words, which do not have referents in material reality, as meaningless. When Russell said that a proposition must have a sense of reality, he only means that it must be able of being compared with reality whether or not it talks about a non-existent entity (e.g. “I met a unicorn” makes sense because I can compare it with reality and see whether there is actually a unicorn. But this is false because there exists no unicorn). Russell asserted that “the golden mountain” and “the round square” would seem to have no meaning, but in examining the meaning, we must not examine the descriptions (the golden mountain and the round square) in isolation. We must not look for the meaning of an individual word (or of a particular description) but look for the meaning of the whole proposition (“… the definition to be sought is a definition of propositions in which the phrase occurs, not a definition of phrase in isolation”). Hence, with Russell’s theory of Descriptions, we can now talk of “the golden mountain” and “the round square” as meaningful.

Following this line of argument, the statement “The present King of France is bald” is meaningful even if it is false because there is no actual King of France. The statement makes sense because it is capable of being asserted and we can indeed compare it with reality. Even if there is no King of France, we can picture an if-then situation, i.e. “If there is a present King of France, then it is bald”. In this sense, the statement becomes meaningful.

Strawson, on the other hand, does not actually try to refute the whole of Russell’s Descriptions. He merely stated that the theory rests under certain fundamental mistakes. On his essay, he stated that Russell implies that “…an expression intended to be a logically proper name (in contrast to what Russell call as description) is meaningless unless there is some single object for which it stands”; that it is only the name, which must designate something, that could only be used as a subject in a sentence with a subject-predicate form. Strawson is saying that this account of Russell fails to include expressions used in the uniquely referring way (e.g. it, this, that, etc.) as those that can be used as subjects.

Strawson used the example “The King of France is wise” in stating that we have to consider the context. He said that the sentence might be uttered at various times, from the time when France is still a monarchy until now that it is already a republic. Hence, (according to Strawson) Russell cannot just say that the statement is false by virtue of referring it to reality and confirming whether there is in fact a King of France. We must take into consideration how the sentence is used, for “we cannot talk of the sentence being true or false, but only of its being used to make a true or false assertion”. Strawson criticizes Russell and says that he cannot use the sentence to refer to something in reality in looking for its meaning because mentioning (or referring to) is a characteristic of the use of an expression. The meaning of a sentence is its function, not its constituent in reality.

Lastly, Strawson would say that the statement “The present King of France is bald” has no truth-value. We cannot ask whether it is true or false because there is no King of France. The statement, which is not actually incompatible with saying that “There is no King of France”, is significant; but if we would want to talk about it truly or falsely (that is, with truth-value), we certainly have to use it in talking about someone. Strawson says that Russell created a mistake when the latter said that to speak of “The present king of France is bald” is to say that “There is at least one, and at most one King of France, which is a member of bald things”. The statement, as he said, contains not an existential assertion, but a mere referring phrase, and since it fails to refer to an actual present King of France, we cannot talk of its truth or falsity.

I am actually inclined to think that the meaning of a statement is its function in the linguistic community. I have argued about this several times in different essays. However, this does not mean that I reject Russell’s view and hold as more acceptable Strawson’s. Strawson made an important account on meaningfulness of a statement as dependent on context but failed to refute Russell’s theory. Furthermore, the theory of Descriptions is not actually incompatible with saying that context is important in analyzing a statement; hence, a combination of the two theories must be the solution to this issue. Let me explain these one by one.

First, let me argue that if we will strictly follow Russell’s theory of Descriptions, we would fail to account the value of context and/or of linguistic convention. The statement “The present King of France is bald” may surely be uttered in various periods, so we cannot just analyze the statement using our time and say that it is false. At this point, I agree with Strawson concerning this issue. However, a slight modification of Russell’s theory, without actually eliminating his essential arguments, would tell us that his (Russell’s) theory does not actually discount the value of context and of convention. I will argue on this later.

Second, let me argue that Strawson’s refutations of Russell’s arguments are insufficient. Let me give two points:
(1) Strawson argues that Russell implies that a name will be meaningful only if it stands for a particular object, and in this way, Russell fails to include expressions used in a uniquely referring way (e.g. it, this, that, etc.). This is just Strawson’s interpretation of Russell’s arguments and I would say that this interpretation is flawed. Russell argues that a name must refer to something, but he also said that in talking of meaning, we analyze the meaning of the proposition as a whole and not of a particular word (e.g. name). Hence, he does not actually discount expressions such as “it”, “this” and “that” because we may see that they can refer to something if we will analyze the whole proposition wherein they are used.
(2) Strawson argued that the statement “The present King of France is bald” is not incompatible with “There is no King of France” because the former contains no existential assertion; hence, Russell is wrong in saying that to state “The present King of France is bald” is to state “There is at least, and at most, one present king of France, which is a member of bald things”. Strawson argued that “the present king of France” is just a referring phrase. I, on the other hand, argue that we cannot refer without having an existential assertion. We cannot make a statement without actually logically implying certain assumptions (i.e. we cannot not assert the existence of present King of France when we assert, “The present King of France is bald”). When we speak of a sentence in a subject-predicate form (The present King of France is bald), we also speak of its if-then situation (If there is a present King of France, then it is bald), where in its antecedent (if there is a present King of France), we are taking into consideration the existence or the non-existence of the subject (the present King of France).

Lastly, Russell’s theory can be modified and interpreted without actually eliminating the essential points. Strawson’s example “The King of France is wise” may surely be uttered by different persons in different periods (one during the time of the first King of France when it is still a monarchy; and the other during the second King of France). In this manner, one proposition, used in different periods by two different people may have different truth-values. This is not actually incompatible with Russell’s theory. We just have to modify it and say that in knowing the truth-value of a statement, we have to consider the time, the situation and the context of the speaker before we compare it to reality. In knowing the truth-value of an uttered statement (e.g. “The King of France is wise” uttered by a person who lived during the time of the first king of France, referring to the first King of France), we compare it to a reality, which must include the real referent (the first King of France); wherein we can only know that the real referent is the first King of France if we will examine the nature of the utterance (by examining the context). This would not contradict Russell’s theory; it is actually compatible to a view that Russell will surely not reject – that a statement cannot be both true and false at the same time; but it can be if it is uttered and used in different contexts (in different time).

An Essay Concerning –ity: relativity and subjectivity

This essay aims at: (1) clarifying the distinction between relativity and subjectivity, and (2) examining a belief system, i.e. Science – whether it is objective and gives us Absolute certainties or whether it starts with subjectivity and gives us Relative claims. The point of doing this is to help us in our further enquiry on the nature of knowledge and of knowing; examining subjectivity and relativity examines our nature of knowing and helps us make an account of the knowledge that we have. Whether there is actually a metaphysical Absolute Truth (or ‘noumena’ that we cannot know) or only epistemological Relative truths is not part of this enquiry. The focus is only on the level of knowing and that which we can only know without necessarily making an account on the existence or non-existence of ‘noumena’.

Relativism (a framework that believes in Relativity) comes in different senses but the main claim is that ‘truth is not Absolute’ (that there is no truth with a capital ‘T’). On one hand, Relativism claims that something (e.g. truth) is relational or relative to something that is outside of it (e.g. it may be an individual, historical circumstances, community, etc.) Protagoras’ doctrine of Relativistic Truth, which stems from his claim ‘Man is the measure of all things’, is an example of Relativism wherein truth/Truth is relative to an individual. The doctrine may actually be paraphrased as this: “Truth is significant only because of an individual that makes it”, and this is what makes it relative. Another example of Relativism is Ethical Relativism, which claims that ‘what is ethical is only relative (or dependent) on culture’. This is different from the previous sort of Relativism as the previous shows the truth as relative to an individual while this shows the truth on ethics as relative to culture. Both show that the existence of something, i.e. truth, is dependent on something, i.e. either an individual or community.

Here, we can infer that in Relativism, the existence, quality, or significance of something is dependent upon another something’s existence. This is the second sense of Relativism, which is actually deducible from the first sense. Thus, in Relativism, we cannot talk of metaphysical things (e.g. Truth) if we are to say that these beyond physical things exist in their own right and are devoid of any significant relation[1] to either an individual or community. Hence, metaphysically speaking, there is no Truth (using Relativism); Truth cannot exist in its own right, outside of either individual or community. However, epistemologically speaking, Truth/truth exists as something that is dependent upon something (either individual or community/cultural constructs). In this case, hard Relativism could be described as something whose concern is only at the level of knowing then jumps at concluding that nothing that is beyond our ability to know exists – that there is no entity (e.g. Truth) that can exist metaphysically; no entity that can exist outside of the knower/s.

Subjectivity, on the other hand, does not necessarily deny the existence of the Absolute. It focuses on the experience of the subject whether or not there is something in the object (the object of subject’s experience) that the subject does not experience. Kant’s ‘phenomena’, for example, is subjective because it depends on our experience of a particular thing; it shows how that particular thing appears to us. The fact that what we can only perceive is this appearance of things (phenomena) does not deny the existence of ‘noumena’ (or the objective component of a thing). Moreover, our subjective experiences in this world do not imply the non-existence of an Absolute Truth. Hence, we should not be confused and say that the terms ‘relative’ and ‘subjective’ are just the same. Subjectivism does not necessarily disregard a metaphysical (Absolute) Truth.

However, the argument on Subjectivity does not also necessarily imply the existence of a metaphysical and Absolute Truth. Indeed, some subjectivist theories may lead to Relativistic ones. These theories claim that there is no noumenon; that because our subjective experiences deal only with phenomena, we cannot say that noumena exist. Here, ‘knowing’ is said to be ‘mind-dependence’ – that there is nothing outside of us that our minds cannot know and that the truth about everything we can know (or everything) is dependent on how we perceive and conceive it.

At this point, we can make a clear distinction between Subjectivity and Relativity: Subjectivity focuses on experience, which is private to the individual, without necessarily making an account on metaphysical things; Relativity focuses on the claim that there is nothing in the thing, which is (metaphysically) Absolute, e.g. Truth, regardless of the method/s[2] used to arrive at such claim.

When it comes to truths of belief systems, we start by saying that the truth of a particular thing is either subjective or objective, and not as either absolute or relative (because relativity and Absoluteness deal not with particulars as they deal not with experience; they rather deal with the universals). Examples of subjective truths are those of opinions (as opinions are dependent solely on our subjective experiences), e.g. “Chocolate flavored ice cream is more delicious than vanilla flavored ice cream”. Recognition of the subjectivity of taste could lead to a conclusion that ‘Taste is relative’. The statement “This table is red” could also be a subjective truth (depending on theories) if we are to say that the red-ness is recognized as an appearance of a thing and is grasped through our subjective experience of the table. However, if we are to say that color is a primary quality of a thing (as opposed to Locke’s claim), then the statement is not a subjective truth as it rests not on our subjective experience of the table but on the table itself. The issue on this statement needs further investigation but we cannot speak of it as of this moment. There is a need for another essay to discuss this issue.

Examples of objective truths are the logical truths, e.g. A = A, A ≠ ~A, etc. There is no question when it comes to objectivity of these logical truths, so let me focus on the ‘considered objective truths’ or those that we can get from Science.

The claims, “Biology is the study of living things”, “Salt is Sodium Chloride (NaCl)” and “The amount of Force can be obtained by multiplying the mass with acceleration” are said to be objective truths. The first one is true by virtue of definition. It is analytic and could be lined up in the list of logically true propositions (because of analyticity). The second one is true as concluded through observation. The third one is true by virtue of being a Scientific law (second law of motion), and as a result of calculations and derivations from other pre-established laws. The objectivity of the second and third claims is still questionable. First, because they are not analytic and so we cannot say that they are true a priori. Second, they are products of empirical observation and any other observation of a fact contradictory to them could lead to their falsity.[3]

In this case, scientific claims cannot actually claim objectivity. Through the want of scientists to arrive at objective truths or an Absolute Truth, they tried to institutionalize scientific claims, which actually made Science Relative. The Truth of Science is Relative in the sense that its claims are relative or relational to the scientific community; anything that they accept is scientific, anything that they reject is unscientific. If the previous examples (second and third Scientific claims in the previous paragraph) are falsified through experimentation, observation and Mathematical calculations, they will be devoid of being called as Scientific claims. The objectivity of Science is not really objective because it is not possible for us to be extremely loyal to the object; we cannot speak of anything that we did not experience in the object. In science, scientists can only have an account of their subjective experiences (through experimentation and observation) of objects. Through their want to claim these subjective experiences as objective truths, they institutionalize their claims, which actually makes Scientific claims Relative. Science merely purports to be objective in its being Relative.

[1] Let me use significant relation to mean the relation of something to another something without which that another something, something would not exist.
[2] With ‘methods’ that lead to a relativistic claim, I am referring to either subjective experience of an individual or conventional claims of a community.
[3] “Salt is NaCl” can be falsified if someone happens to discover that salt is actually composed of (let’s say) two atoms of Sodium per Chlorine. In this case, the statement is wrong and must be replaced with “Salt is Na2Cl”.
“The amount of Force can be obtained by multiplying the mass with acceleration” can be falsified if any scientific proposition that is contradictory with it will be considered as true or if through calculations, it were disproved.

A Critique on Berkeley’s Epistemology

This essay is a sort of reaffirmation of some of the arguments that I used in my final paper in my Philosophy 197 (Philosophic Problems) class.[1] There are, of course, certain additions, but the claim is still the same – that matter exists independently of the human mind. My arguments imply Realism but to discuss such would require another course of work. As for this essay, the focus is on the refutation of Subjective Idealism and certain implications of refuting such.

Idealism, as opposed to Realism, views the world as a mental construct (where the world is the sum of all objects and these objects are not of matter, but of ideas). Berkeley’s Subjective Idealism holds the same and considers the mind of man as paramount in knowing that objects (that are of ideas) exist. In this philosophy, matter is viewed as non-existent; objects are just the collections of sense data (that are not material) in those who perceive them.

The usual example that I use in explaining Berkeley’s philosophy is the perception of a ball. Let us say I am seeing a ball and in seeing it, I might infer that I am indeed seeing the ball itself. With this theory, it would be argued that in my perception of the ball, what is observed is the idea of the ball in my mind and not the ball itself.[2] Berkeley would say that it is impossible for me to compare the ball itself to my idea of it since what I can only observe is my idea of the ball. Hence, what we can only verify and claim as existents are the ideas and not the material objects themselves. In this case, material objects do not exist in their own right; they are just products of the mind. In our assumption of their existence, we infer that they indeed exist and that they and our ideas of them in our minds have a necessary connection.

Berkeley’s arguments make a lot of sense. It accounts the limit of the human mind and its inability to verify the existence of matter. Furthermore, it challenges the self – evidence of the existence of a material world and offers a possibility that an external world may not be a material world. However, though it could be argued that some philosophies are merely assuming that material objects exist without giving proofs because they are pointing to the self – evidence of their existence, Berkeley’s arguments also tends to be fallacious. It somehow commits argumentum ad ignorantiam as it claims that matter does not exist because it cannot be verified. Berkeley himself jumped into a conclusion that he himself cannot fully prove; inability to verify the material object’s existence does not imply its non-existence.

There also seems to be a problem in his rejection of Locke’s view regarding primary and secondary qualities. He argues that since it is the ideas, and not the material objects that consist reality, the qualities of the material objects exist only in the mind. There is nothing, according to him, that is in the object but what is perceived. Once objects are perceived, they are perceived; there is no distinction between primary and secondary qualities. The example that I used in my essay in supporting the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that of the blood. Blood as perceived is red in color; but with a thorough investigation, we would understand that the blood appears only as red because of the oxygen present in it. Through looking at a microscope, we could not see the redness of the blood as how our naked eyes see it; what we can only see in the microscope are tiny particles that are not red in color. There must be a recognition that the redness of the blood is not in the blood itself. It must be taken into consideration that primary qualities of the blood (or those that are of the blood itself) must be different from the secondary qualities of it that is dependent on how the object is perceived (what our naked eyes see is not what the object itself possesses).

Furthermore, if objects are not composed of matter, then where are the ideas of these objects based? Surely, it may be argued that ideas may be based from ideas (that the ideas I have in my mind is based on the ideas existing outside of me). However, if the ideas in my mind are based on ideas that exist in the external world, then we could also ask ourselves on how we can be able to verify whether these ideas have true likeness to the ideas where they are based. It commits the same problem that Berkeley noticed in the view that ideas are based on the existence of material objects that are outside of us. Here, we could observe that problem lies in naming. Others hold that idea in the mind is based on matter; Berkeley holds that idea in the mind is based on idea. If we will clearly look at the arguments, they are just the same; both hold that the ideas in the mind are based on the external world. It is just that Berkeley wished not to call the existents in the external world as material (as Science claims). The problem lies on language; the problem is whether those we wish to perceive or those that exist in the external world would be called matters or ideas. There is no point in debating whether the external world is material (composed of matter) or Ideal (composed of ideas) because we cannot speak of those that we cannot verify.[3]

Berkeley’s arguments also imply that existence is an accidental property of an object; that it exists because it is perceived. It contradicts that existence is an essential property of an object. Claiming that existence is merely an object’s accidental property would lead to absurdity. If existence is already an accidental property, then there is nothing in the object that is essential. An object will not have properties (though it may have potentialities; but potentialities are not properties of the object) if it does not exist. Furthermore, existence is not a property that is a predicate of an object. The object is its existence. Hence, its existence cannot be merely accidental such that it exists because it is perceived. We cannot take away from an object its right to exist on its own.

My arguments imply Realism and might be considered as a support of Kant’s concept of noumena (as obvious in footnote 3 of this essay). Berkeley could have asked me as to how the unperceived (the noumena) exist. How could those in the external world exist if I cannot perceive them? I would point out that there are those in things that we cannot perceive though we can be certain (in principle) that they exist. We know that infinity exists. In principle, we can understand infinity; we can know infinity by its being infinite though we cannot know and perceive the whole of it. If objects have this infinity then it is most likely that objects have something that we cannot actually know. Let me use a dog as an example. If we are to dissect a dog, we could observe its parts or organs. We could further observe that these organs are composed of tissues, tissues of cells, cells of DNA, until we reach the littlest thing that we could observe or the atom. Scientifically speaking, atom is the most basic unit of a thing, but science also recognizes that atom has parts (protons, neutrons and electrons). Science does not deny that atom is still divisible into fragments (in fact, nuclear fission proves that atomic nuclei are divisible into fragments). In principle, we could understand that the parts of the atom are consisted of tiny particles that we could not observe and the tiny particles are still composed of smaller particles, etc. Here, we could observe that there is infinity in a thing and we cannot perceive and know the whole of it even though we can recognize its infinity. We could infer from here that there are those that exist even if they are beyond our perception.
There are still more in Berkeley’s philosophy that I wish to explore. However, what has been written is already enough to challenge[4] Berkeley’s epistemology using Subjective Idealism. I would no longer question his assumption of the existence of a Grand Perceiver nor elaborate more on my previous arguments. I would not even discuss here my view regarding reality and external world. These would require another course of enquiry. The purpose of this essay is simply to provide a critique on Berkeley’s epistemology.

[1] My essay “Objectivity of Reality of the external world” tried to refute Berkeley’s subjective idealism in proving that an external world, which is material, “exists even when there is no mind to perceive it and even if I cease to exist”. The essay also claims that “reality exists independently of the human mind and that there can be no other world or realities than this one”.
[2] The ball itself and the idea of the ball are not the same; the ball itself points to an object existing in the outside world while the idea of the ball points to an object existing in the mind.
[3] There is a futility in perplexing ourselves whether external world is material or Ideal if we are to recognize that we cannot verify them. All that we can only verify and thus speak of are those that exist in our minds. If an external world exists (whether it is material or not), we cannot be sure whether our perception of it is the same with how it exists. This, however, does not mean that Berkeley’s argument is absurd. This simply points out that there seems to be a vicious cycle in perplexing ourselves with this problem.
[4] The term ‘challenge’ is more appropriate than the term refute

On the Role of Reason

(A critique on Hume’s account on reason)

Hume’s account on reason is controversial; it is opposed to the old Western view that the mind is higher than the body – that reason is higher than sensation. Hume has actually been very consistent in his philosophy; it is not only in his epistemology that he claims that reason is just a species of sensation, he also claims in his ethical and aesthetic philosophies that the reason is a slave of passion. What does he mean by this?

David Hume does not only claim that there are no innate principles in the mind, he also claims that our ideas, wherein which our reason deals with, are just copies of our impressions. These impressions are the products of our sensation, i.e. these are our perceptions when we see, hear, feel, taste, etc. those that are in the material world. These impressions give rise to our sentiments or passions regarding a particular object or thing. Reasoning, for Hume, comes after we receive these impressions and deals with them soon after we have them. Reasoning comes only after we experience the material world; hence, we cannot possibly reason if we did not have any experiences yet (for there are no ideas wherein our reason will deal with). This is what is meant by saying that ‘reason cannot extend beyond our immediate experiences’.

Reason deals with either matters of fact or relations of ideas; it ‘conveys the knowledge of truth and of falsehood’[1]. Impression, on the other hand, gives rise to sentiments or passions that are not subject to the discovery of truth or falsehood; they are thoughts (motivations) in the mind, separate from the outside world. It is the passion or sentiment that produces approbation or blame; it is the passion or sentiment that drives us to act. Reason cannot be the motivation of our actions because it only deals with the agreement of our ideas (within the mind and/or as related to the world), which made it ‘a slave of passions’

This view is revolutionary; it deviates from the traditional view. However, something seems wrong with this. Let us try to examine it captiously.

The role of reason and of sentiment in Hume’s philosophy could be seen in this step-by-step process: (1) Reason understands the facts after we have the impressions acquired from the material world, e.g. after working on the relations of the ideas of a gun and of killing, my reason would tell me that I can use the gun to kill a person. (2) The sentiment would be stimulated by the facts that are set by reason; it would produce either approbation or blame, e.g. I disapprove of using the gun to kill a person due to a certain feeling against it. (3) I will act based on the sentiment, e.g. I will not use the gun to kill a person.

I, on the other hand, believe that the case is like this: (1) and (2) same as above, (3) Reason functions through willing, e.g. Based on my disapproval of using the gun to kill a person, what would I do? (4) I will act based on my ‘will’ or reason.

The difference between the two is that the former does not take into consideration the act of “willing” as independent from sentiment. Hume would say that if I did not act according to what I approve, it must be because I am driven by another passion or sentiment.

I am wholly against this view of Hume. The feeling of approbation on a thing is different from the act of deciding on whether to follow such feeling. It is only us who put a necessary connection between the two because we tend to find the necessary causes of our actions. This view (of mine) is not incompatible with saying that the mental processes are just neurophysiological processes in the brain (just like what I tend to argue in my critique on Descartes[2]); for if sentiment / feeling about a thing and reasoning are both mental processes, and are thus, neurophysiological, it does not mean that they comprise one process (or that they are identical with one another). Reasoning is a brain process that occurs and performs a function different and independent from other brain processes including the feeling about a thing (sentiment).

Accepting Hume’s theory is accepting a seemingly infinite regress of motives or passions in such a way that all our actions are defined. It rejects the possibility of choosing and willing as independent from any motives. It accounts that even if I am able to choose on whether to act according to a motive, I am still choosing based on another motive. Hume’s philosophy limits us in such a way that all our actions are defined by only one sort of mental process – by the process that deals with sentiments or passions. It fails to account that the other sort of brain or mental process (thinking or reasoning) acts on a way of its own. Even if the two sorts of mental process may influence each other, they still function differently and independently from each other.

Lastly, though I do not wish to be a representative of the traditional Western view, I would firmly argue that Reason is not a slave of passion, not even a species of sensation. As Kant (in his Critique of Pure Reason) said, we started to have knowledge when we started to have experience, but not all knowledge arises out of experience. This is for the reason that there are transcendental presuppositions in the mind. One of them is the most basic logical principle where all other logical principles are derived and which I learned not from experience – the Principle of Identity (that ‘A is A’)[3].

[1] Classical and Ethical Theories. David Hume, The Principles of Morals, p. 259
[2] from my essay, A Critique on Descartes’ Dualism
[3] a more elaboration regarding the transcendental presuppositions can be found in my essay, Can Logical Principles be falsified by Experience?